Did The Warriors Ruin The Dynasty By Blowing The Draft? An In-Depth Series (2020 version)
Did The Warriors Ruin The Dynasty By Blowing The Draft? An In-Depth Series (2020 version)
Let's look at who was available and how other dynasties did.
Did The Warriors Ruin The Dynasty By Blowing The Draft? An In-Depth Series (2020 version)
2022 Update
This entire series has been updated at Did The Warriors Ruin The Dynasty By Blowing The Draft? An In-Depth Series (2022 update)
Overview
The conventional wisdom is that the 2014-2019 Dynasty Warriors messed up their chance to extend the dynasty by poor drafting. Heck, this was my wisdom before writing this article series. In this series, we will look at all the possible draft pick alternatives, and also study the draft results of all other NBA dynasties.
I wrote this series in 2020. It will be very interesting to update this piece now that we have the benefits of more time.
Too Long; Didn’t Read (Spoilers)
This is the ultra-short summary. For details, read this series.
It turns out that the Warriors drafted reasonably well overall relative to the other players that were available. They didn’t always get the top player available, but they usually got one of the top, with one glaring exception.
It also turns out that the Warriors drafted quite well compared to every dynasty since the 1980s. The 1980s dynasties (Lakers, Celtics, Sixers) had great drafts, but mainly through high draft picks (#8 and lower) that they got through trades from ripping off incompetent pre-modern NBA owners.
The Series
These parts are all collected in this one article, but this table of contents also has links to original posts from 2020 with contemporary reader comments.
1. What Better Draft Picks Were Available? (2020)
1a. What Better Draft Picks Were Available, Re-visited (2022) (planned)
2019 Jordan Poole and Eric Paschall
2020 James Wiseman, Nico Mannion, Justinian Jessup
2021 Jonathan Kuminga and Moses Moody
2. What Breakout Prospects Did GSW Let Get Away?
3. How Well Did Other Dynasties Draft?
Part 11: Comparing the Michael Jordan Bulls
Part 12: Comparing the Bad Boy Pistons and Julius Erving Sixers
Part 13: Comparing the Larry Bird Celtics
Part 14: Comparing the Magic Johnson Lakers
1. What Better Draft Picks Were Available?
The conventional wisdom is that the 2014-2019 Dynasty Warriors messed up their chance to extend the dynasty by poor drafting. Heck, this was my wisdom before writing this article series. After all, look at the draft picks, 2015-2018.
2015
#30. Kevon Looney. Very injury prone, didn’t play for two years, was almost cut, turned out to be a great smallball center, made key contributions in the 2018 and 2019 Playoffs.
#60. Traded to IND in 2011 in the Brandon Rush - Louis Amundson trade.
2016
#30. Damian Jones. Athletic flashes as JaVale McGee Junior, but very injury prone and inconsistent, leading to his being traded to make the D’Angelo Russell sign-and-trade possible.
#38. Patrick McCaw. Occasional moments, including some nice spot minutes in the 2017 Finals, but wanted a bigger role and forced a trade. Pick acquired through cash considerations.
#60. Traded away in the Andre Iguodala sign-and-trade (for Andris Biedrins, Richard Jefferson, Brandon Rush, the 2014 1st, 2016 2nd, 2017 1st, 2017 2nd, 2018 2nd and cash).
2017
#38. Jordan Bell. Spectacular cult hero with key contributions in the 2018 HOU series and a role player in other parts of 2018 and 2019, but overall minor impact.
#30 and #60. Iguodala trade (see above).
2018
#28. Jacob Evans. Never quite found his shot, got minimal playing time, was shifted to point guard, and then was traded to get out of luxury tax repeater penalty.
#58. Iguodala trade (see above).
Objectively, no game-changing picks and only Looney was a big contributor (after missing two years). Perhaps if the Warriors had drafted better or made better trades with the picks, they could have infused the roster with playoff contributors that would have extended the dynasty.
On the other hand, were there really better players available to be drafted? And the draft order is specifically set up to make it hard for championship teams to draft well, so have any other Dynasties drafted better?
So we will analyze whether the Warriors really blew their dynasty through bad drafting by studying
the quality of the draft choices, by seeing who else was drafted after the Warriors pick, and
the quality of draft choices of all other NBA dynasty teams, including consideration of returns from trading draft picks
Re-draft Guidelines
This kind of exercise can get very unrealistic (should we consider every human on the planet available to be drafted?), so I’m going to restrict our search to NBA players actually drafted in the draft after a Finals appearance. For this study, I’m not going to ding the Warriors for not drafting a player that the entire league passed on. Also, undrafted players are sometimes unavailable because of unannounced agreements with teams to sign as a free agent and they refuse to be drafted by anyone in the second round.
The analysis of 2015-2018 drafts were all written in 2020. I plan to update these discussions.
The Re-Drafts
2015 Kevon Looney
Who was a better pick in 2015?
The Warriors picked Kevon Looney at #30. Very injury prone, didn’t play for two years, was almost cut, turned out to be a great smallball center, made key contributions in the 2018 and 2019 Playoffs. Looney has a particular talent for guarding smalls (particularly James Harden) on the pick and roll and in isolation without fouling.
Was planned to be the center of the future, but his injuries have put his whole future in question. There’s a recent good news report about his surgery, but I’ll believe it when he’s healthy and happy on the court.
Of the 30 players drafted after him, only 16 played a single NBA game.
Here are the players who played significant NBA time, ordered by Win Shares:
Montrezl Harrell. Big hustle guy and a dynamic smallball center. Played strong minutes off the bench for Houston Rockets and Los Angeles Clippers. A good finisher on the pick and roll. Rated somewhat worse on defense. Harrell signed a 2 year contract for $12M and Looney signed a 3 year contract for $15M. So Harrell is probably regarded a bit more highly in the league, but it’s debatable how much of an upgrade he is over Looney for the Warriors in their system.
Josh Richardson. A budding star in Miami, he was traded last season to the 76ers, and announced by Elton Brand thus: “He has worked diligently and improved each season. As one of the NBA’s best young two-way talents, Josh’s ability to space the floor while also effectively guarding multiple positions at an elite level will bolster our lineup immediately”. Last season was a bit of a shooting struggle, and advanced stats are not excited about JR. But he’s undoubtedly NBA starting caliber and the biggest find in this second round.
Richaun Holmes. A very good defensive big who flashed in his second season some nice play as a stretch big (what happened to that?) before abandoning the three ball. A solid bench player with PHI and PHX who got elevated to starter last year with SAC. Possibly a defensive upgrade on Looney? He signed a 2-year $9.77M contract, so similar valuing to Looney. Not an obvious big upgrade.
Kevon Looney. Our guy.
Norman Powell is a good defender and has developed in his fourth and fifth year a consistent 3 point stroke. This last year, he’s become an occasional starter for TOR and become a super sixth man. GSW would consider swapping him for Looney today, but not in his first 4 years, when Looney made his crucial playoff contributions. I can’t ding GSW for missing on Powell.
Plus four bench players that are not upgrades over Looney. Willy Hernangómez, Pat Connaughton, Andrew Harrison, Cedi Osman.
How did GSW do against the field?
Bleacher Report re-drafted the 2015 NBA Draft and took Kevon Looney #19.
DraftSite re-drafted 2015, and took Looney #18.
Kevon Looney had the #13 most Win Shares of his 2015 draft class and #10 highest Value Over Replacement Player.
So GSW got solid value out of the #30 pick.
2015 Pick Grade: B
I’m going to call this one a solid draft pick by the Warriors. Looney made crucial contributions, but also missed the first two years of his career. This was an intentional choice, as GSW pursued a strategy of drafting for high upside with value damaged by injury concerns (see Jones, Damian). It’s looking quite unclear that Looney will ever contribute big meaningful minutes in the future, but he peaked and made strong contributions in the 2018 and 2019 playoffs.
You could also argue GSW missed on Josh Richardson, but so did a lot of people. You might think more highly of Holmes or Harrell, but I don’t think there is a large upgrade there. As for missing on Richardson, there seemed to be an organizational drive to find the Bigs of the Future in 2015, with Andrew Bogut aging and Festus Ezeli making uncertain progress, and Harrison Barnes doing a decent job at wing.
2016 Damian Jones and Patrick McCaw
Who was a better pick in 2016?
The Warriors picked Damian Jones at #30 and Patrick McCaw at #38. Of the 30 players drafted after Damian Jones, only 5 racked up more Win Shares (not including Pat McCaw).
Here they are, ordered by Win Shares.
Malcolm Brogdon, #36. This dead-eye shooter was the real steal of the draft. He won Rookie of the Year and then posted a 50-40-90 season in 2019. A big miss for the #30 pick.
Ivica Zubac, #32. This big is a passable finisher on offense and a strong shotblocker and rebounder. Underappreciated in LAL, Jerry West fleeced the Lakers and grabbed him for LAC and he has been a steady starter at center for an excellent team. The Warriors would love to have him right now.
Cheick Diallo, #33. A big, plays spot minutes off the bench for NOP and then PHX. Probably not a big upgrade on Damian Jones.
Deyonta Davis, #31. He’s had a bit of a cult following in Dub Nation, but after a promising start in MEM, he ended up in the G-League with the Santa Cruz Warriors, played out a couple of 10-day contracts in ATL and then came back to SCW, where he remains. In comparison, Jones and McCaw haven’t exactly locked in big minutes anywhere, but at least they are still in the NBA.
Jake Layman, #47. After barely playing for two years, he’s worked his way into a first off the bench type role / spot starter in the last two years. Not a star at offense or defense, but eats minutes well.
Patrick McCaw, #38. Our guy. Regarded as a possible second-round steal at the time, he had occasional moments, including some very promising spot minutes in the 2017 Finals, but wanted a bigger role and forced a trade. Has been a light-minutes bench player since then.
Damian Jones, #30. Our guy again. Athletic flashes, but very injury prone and inconsistent. Barely played for two years, then got dusted off to serve as JaVale McGee lite, which he did adequately until his injury. He was thrust into coming back early from injury into a way too big role in the 2019 Playoffs. His inconsistency led to his being traded to make the D’Angelo Russell sign-and-trade possible.
How did GSW do against the field?
Patrick McCaw had the #24 most Win Shares of his 2015 draft class and #37 highest Value Over Replacement Player. Bleacher Report took him #29 in a 2020 redraft. DraftSite took McCaw at #21.
Damian Jones had the #25 most Win Shares of his 2015 draft class and #15 highest Value Over Replacement Player. In the 2020 redraft, Bleacher Report did not take Jones in the first round, nor did DraftSite.
So McCaw was good value at #38, and Damian Jones was probably around expected value for the #30, maybe a bit below.
2016 Pick Grades: Patrick McCaw, C+. Damian Jones, D.
The McCaw pick was a good one, from the maneuvers to get the second round pick, to picking probably the best player available at #38. However, the grade gets penalized because the team didn’t develop him into a role he could embrace.
The Damian Jones pick is less defensible at #30. The Warriors got very limited value out of him, they missed on two players they would love to have today (Brogdon, Zubac), and even Diallo or Layman could be giving solid minutes-eating off the bench. But this was an intentional gamble, as GSW pursued a strategy of drafting for players with high upside with their value damaged by injury concerns (see Looney, Kevon).
2017 Jordan Bell
Who was a better pick in 2017?
The Warriors picked Jordan Bell at #38. They famously bought the pick from the Bulls for Cash Considerations™. I was one of the very first on the Bell Bandwagon, living and dying with my irrational good feeling.
Emergency Jordan Bell Memorial Post: Irrationally Good Feelings. More Jordan Bell analysis videos than you can shake a stick at.
The players drafted after Bell, ordered by Win Shares:
Monte Morris, #51. Spent most of year 1 in the G-League, but ended up as a very solid PG off the bench for DEN.
Thomas Bryant, #42. This big also spent year 1 in the G-League and then got dumped by the Lakers, I believe as part of the LeBron Capital Incorporated buyout and purge. He’s now a significant rotation player for WAS flashing some stretch-5 potential.
Jordan Bell, #38. Our guy. Spectacular cult hero with crucial contributions in the 2018 HOU series and some spot minutes in the 2019 Finals, but overall a role player with minor impact after he got in Steve Kerr’s doghouse.
Sterling Brown, #46. Plays spot minutes as a bench wing for MIL. 3-and-D potential.
Damyean Dotson, #44. Bench player playing 16 MPG for the woeful NYK.
Dillon Brooks, #45. Decent defending 3-and-D who’s started for MEM ever since his rookie year, except for Year 2 when he was injured.
Dillon Brooks is the one person that I think could have made a bigger contribution to the GSW title runs and is the only player I’d take over Bell. GSW was focused on getting the bigs of the future back then (drafting Looney, Jones, and Bell) so Brooks was probably not on their radar, given that they must have seen fellow Oregon Duck Brooks on every college video clip they scouted of Bell. Too bad.
Morris and Bryant have turned into solid players, but went straight from the draft into the G-League. GSW was playing to win the trophy every year and couldn’t wait for a project to mature like that. (On the other hand, GSW took flyers on Looney and D Jones, whom they knew would lose a lot of time healing from injury, so… shrug…)
How did GSW do against the field?
Jordan Bell had the #17 most Win Shares of his 2015 draft class and the #11 highest Value Over Replacement Player.
Bleacher Report took him #30 in a 2020 redraft. DraftSite took Bell at #24.
Solid value for the #38 pick.
2017 Pick Grades: Jordan Bell, B-
The Jordan Bell pick was a good one, from the maneuvers to get the second round pick, to picking arguably the best player available at #38 (outside of Dillon Brooks). He made crucial contributions in the 2018 Playoffs and also the liquor company Hennessy’s financial results after the 2018 parade.
The grade gets dinged because the team didn’t develop him into a role he could embrace. Yes, this is almost word-for-word what I wrote about Patrick McCaw. Make of that what you will.
2018 Jacob Evans
Who was a better pick in 2018?
The Warriors picked Jacob Evans at #28.
He was imagined as a three-and-D-ish shooting guard, but his jumper developed a hitch late in his college career, and in the NBA, he completely lost confidence in his shot.
This season, GSW tried to retool him as a Rajon Rondo style no-shot point guard defender, and there were a few signs of life. But finally GSW ended the experiment, in the mad scramble to get under the luxury tax mid-season, and traded Evans.
Of the 32 players drafted after Jacob Evans, a whopping 14 players have played more NBA minutes than Evans (247 minutes): Bruce Brown, Jalen Brunson, Mitchell Robinson, Rodions Kurucs, Devonte' Graham, Omari Spellman, Élie Okobo, De'Anthony Melton, Hamidou Diallo, Jevon Carter, Sviatoslav Mykhailiuk, Keita Bates-Diop, Shake Milton, and Isaac Bonga.
Here are the players drafted after him with more than 1,000 NBA minutes ordered by Win Shares. Fifteen players taken after Evans had more Win Shares. The list is so long, and Evans had so little impact, that I’m only going to look at four of them.
Mitchell Robinson, #36. An energy big who finishes strong, he’s already one of the top shot-blockers in the league (#2 last year, #6 this year), and he’s also elite at steals for a big. He terrorizes the offensive boards as well. He fouls a lot and his defensive rebounding is average (must be all the shot block attempts), but it’s easy to imagine him starting for GSW right now.
Jalen Brunson, #33. Backup point guard for DAL, so-so shooting, below-average assist rate, but he can get to the rim. Probably better than his numbers, as he was stuck in a minutes crunch between Doncic and J.J. Barea sucking up all his time.
Bruce Brown, #42. Starting combo guard for DET, a good defender with a shaky shot.
Omari Spellman, #30. Hey, we know this guy! And we got him this season, and played him a lot more minutes than Evans.
Devonte' Graham. Etc.
Rodions Kurucs
De'Anthony Melton
Élie Okobo
How did GSW do against the field?
Jacob Evans had the #40 most Win Shares of his 2015 draft class and the #48 highest Value Over Replacement Player.
Bleacher Report did not take him in the first round in a 2020 redraft. DraftSite took Evans at #28, which I find quite shocking and probably a typo.
A very bad return for the #28 pick.
2018 Pick Grades: Jacob Evans, F.
Okay, no need to belabor this one. This is the only complete misfire draft pick. GSW only got garbage-time minutes out of Evans.
Honestly, the alternatives weren’t stars (unless you count Mitchell Robinson), so the pain could have been a lot worse.
But there were plenty of positive contributors to be had, and the Five Finals run ended with the Warriors painfully weak on the bench.
2. What Breakout Prospects Did GSW Let Get Away?
Is there a way to include undrafted players (that later developed via free agency, G-League, etc.) in these analyses too?
You see this come up a fair amount, particularly when some player that went undrafted or unclaimed on waivers has a breakout game. “Why couldn’t the Warriors have picked that guy up?” The regret that really stings is when you actually had the player on your team, either on the roster or in training camp.
Let’s look at the players most mourned by Dub Nation that the Five Finals Warriors teams had in the organization, but let get away.
Gary Trent Jr
Gary Trent Jr has been one of the breakout stars of the Bubble. Last night, he went from Blazers playoff scapegoat…
to hitting the game sealing three.
Even Draymond Green was tweet-analyzing his savvy play earlier in the bubble.
If the Warriors could teleport bubble GTJ onto the roster, would they? Probably yes. He’s a 6-6 wing with a good jumper who makes smart plays. However, let’s look back at:
the decision to pass on him in the draft (Spoiler: bad decision)
GTJ’s first year in the league to see if he would have helped GSW in their playoff run (Spoiler: no)
and whether he would have stuck with the team into this year. (Spoiler: no.)
Should The Warriors Have Drafted Gary Trent Jr?
Yes, but this is a trickier argument to make than it seems. GTJ made himself available for the 2018 NBA Draft and was ultimately selected #37. GSW had the #28 pick, and they selected Jacob Evans III.
So given how things unfolded with Jacob Evans, almost any other draft pick would have been better. However, if GSW could redo the pick, they arguably should go for Mitchell Robinson instead, already one of the top shot-blockers and offensive-rebounders in the league. If you don’t want Robinson, you might prefer our dear recent Warrior Omari Spellman as a pick instead.
GTJ was a tricky pick to project, as he was scouted as having a great three-point shot and so-so everything else. A quick scan of 2018 mock drafts landed him at #20, agonizingly at #28 to GSW, #30, #41. Generally speaking, he was considered late 1st round material, so it would have been very reasonable for GSW to pick him up at #28. But instead they went with the better reputation defender in Evans.
Verdict: Yes, all subtleties aside, GSW would have been better off drafting Gary Trent Jr. but only because Evans didn't work out at all.
Would Gary Trent Jr Have Helped The 2018-19 Playoff Run?
Here’s the part of the story that you don’t hear. GTJ played only garbage time in 2018-19 for POR, and on Jan 20, they sent him to the G-League.
Rip City Project wrote at the time:
Trent Jr has seen even less court time than Simons this season. He has played only a total of 33 minutes. If the Blazers are not going to give Trent Jr and Simons regular minutes, it makes a lot of sense to let them gain experience in the G-League.
Also, Simons and Trent Jr are both young and relatively raw as players, so it makes sense to have Baldwin and Caleb Swanigan occupying a roster spot instead. As I previously mentioned, Baldwin has been exceptional in the G-League. Swanigan played well earlier this season when he was temporarily part of the rotation.
Trent Jr. bounced up and down between the G-League and the big team, finally totaling 15 NBA games, 111 minutes played. He shot 5-21 from 3 (23.8%), his one elite skill getting him into the league.
Now in a different timeline, perhaps a GSW-drafted GTJ actually blooms quickly. But then you could make a similar fantasy argument about every prospect.
In our timeline, incredibly, everyone’s favorite punching bag Jacob Evans played more games (30), more minutes (204) and shot better from 3, 4-15 (26.7%) in 2018-19 than Gary Trent Jr.
Would GSW Have Kept Gary Trent Jr into 2019-20?
Possibly not. GSW needed to cut salary in order to get under the hard cap to perform the sign-and-trade that got D’Angelo Russell in return for Kevin Durant.
The only reason they might have kept him is that GSW didn’t give up on Jacob Evans either. And in full disclosure, while Gary Trent Jr couldn’t shoot in the NBA in 2018-19, he did tear it up in the G-League, in 6 games averaging 33.3 PTS on 50% three-point shooting. The world is full of talented G-League players who couldn’t stick in the NBA, but those are some eye-popping numbers.
But everyone who was screaming about Jacob Evans would have screamed louder to cut GTJ. You know it’s true. They would have been more like the first tweet in the article, not the second.
POR didn’t even really give Trent a chance until the middle of the next season, December 2019, when he worked himself into a decent bench role.
And without Trevor Ariza’s decision to skip the bubble to be with his son, GTJ might never have gotten a chance to show POR what he could do with volume play.
Final Verdict
Honestly, not much room for regrets, other than noting that GTJ is looking great and we wish we had him. Everything past that is magical thinking. The only people who can really complain are the ones who were complaining about it when GTJ had been sent to the G-League.
GTJ was noticeably worse in the pros than Jacob Evans III in 2018-19 playing for a team with less pressure to win-now. He might have been cut in 2019 summer, or at least you would have wanted that.
TL;DR: Evans outplayed Trent Jr in the 2018-19 NBA, GTJ would probably have been cut to sign-trade D’Angelo and the grouchy part of Dub Nation would have celebrated. Then we would have all cried this year when he blossomed.
Kendrick Nunn
…and then not, to a lot of moaning and what-ifs from Dub Nation.
League-wide, Nunn became a fan darling and runner-up Rookie of the Year…
… and become a scapegoat during the Covid Cup tournament before having a big performance to help save the season in Finals Game 5.
How Did The Warriors Lose Kendrick Nunn?
Nunn seemed to come out of nowhere for the Miami Heat when he dropped 40 points in a 2019-20 preseason, the highest scoring preseason game by a Heat player in the last 20 years. He continued his hot play into the season:
The Heat’s undrafted rookie guard scored a career-high 28 points on 10-of-15 shooting in 33 minutes Thursday. Nunn’s 112 points to begin the season is the most through five games by an undrafted player in NBA history, surpassing Connie Hawkins’ 105 points to begin 1969-70.
In addition, according to ESPN Stats & Info, Nunn is the first NBA player with 100 points in his first five career games since Kevin Durant in 2007-08 (113).
Some more highlights:
On December 3, Nunn was named Eastern Conference Rookie of the Month after averaging 16.4 points, 3.2 assists and 1.3 steals per contest. On January 2, Nunn became the first undrafted player in NBA history to win multiple Rookie of the Month awards. He won the Rookie of the Month award for a third time for his January performance. He was named to the Rising Stars Game at the 2020 NBA All-Star Game where he scored 16 points for Team USA
So… how did the Warriors miss this guy? Especially since he was on the Santa Cruz Warriors all previous year?!
Let’s consider three contributors:
1. Baggage
I think his personal baggage probably did not contribute much to the actual GSW decision to let Nunn go, but it’s important to at least acknowledge it, since it’s often ignored in casual accounts of his doing undrafted. Wes Goldberg wrote:
He went undrafted in 2018 despite coming off an impressive season at Oakland University in which he was the second-leading scorer in the country behind No. 5 pick Trae Young. The Warriors needed the league’s approval to sign Nunn after a domestic violence case resulted in his dismissal from Illinois in 2016. A woman accused Nunn of choking and pouring water on her. While Nunn agreed to a plea deal, authorities dropped two counts of battery, including the choking charges.
After signing him to their summer league team, the Warriors invited Nunn to training camp, where he had an opportunity to earn a roster spot. However, deep with perimeter talent, the Warriors didn’t have room for Nunn on the regular roster. They signed him to their G League affiliate in Santa Cruz.
So, the Warriors proceeded to give Nunn a spot on their 2018 training camp roster (which by the way was loaded, with Kendrick Nunn and Danuel House getting run and then getting waived) and then extended run in the G-League. So the baggage did make Nunn go undrafted, but the Warriors have given Nunn multiple chances since then.
2. Roster Spot Crunch & Tax
Here is the primary reason Nunn had to go: roster spots. For the 2018-19 season, the Warriors kept Nunn in the G-League as long as possible and used him in a Lou Williams microwave scorer role. Goldberg, again:
Miles encouraged Nunn to embrace a reserve role. The Warriors believed Nunn could have an impact off the bench like L.A. Clippers guard Lou Williams, projecting him as a sixth man who could score in bunches and close games. Nunn averaged 19.3 points on 47.3% shooting overall and 33.5% from 3-point range.
David Aldridge adds:
“I pushed pretty strongly for a 10-day (NBA contract),” said Nunn’s agent, Adam Pensack.
But with the Warriors well into the luxury tax, spending even a 10-day deal for Nunn would actually cost Golden State a couple hundred thousand dollars more in tax payments. Nor was there a roster spot available at the time….
So after the G League’s playoffs ended, Nunn started looking around for an NBA deal. Some teams went the ‘you didn’t start in the G League; why would we sign you?’ route. “It was a pretty surface level analysis,” Pensack said.
Let’s unpack this a bit. The Warriors actually had their 15th roster spot open into March 2019. But they finally used it on returning big man Andrew Bogut. Due to the injuries to DeMarcus Cousins and Damian Jones, the Warriors simply did not have a beefy big man for the playoffs. It’s hard to second-guess the Bogut decision.
The better decision to second-guess is whether the Warriors should have waived a player to make room for Nunn on the main roster, or for a two-way contract.
It was very unlikely that GSW would open a new spot for Nunn on the NBA team. His most direct competition was Damion Lee. And GSW were already struggling with the question of how to get Lee on the playoff roster (and in the end, they left Lee off). Lee is bigger than Nunn, a better defender (see below) who can flex between guard spots and play next to Steph, he can defend wings and guards, and he was shooting better at the time. Nunn would have been at best Lee’s backup.
While Nunn may seem like an overnight sensation in Miami, coaches in Santa Cruz worked with him to standardize his shooting stroke and be more decisive with his dribble.
Once a streaky shooter who could not make 33% of his 3-point attempts in consecutive games in the G League, Nunn is shooting better than 40% in his rookie season. For a guard who used to bide his time with extra dribbles, now Nunn explodes into his first move, either toward the rim or rising up for a jumper.
Also Damion Lee is Stephen Curry’s brother-in-law.
So, no way you’re going to waive this guy to take a flyer on Nunn, especially since the team need at the time was not scoring. You already had Stephen Curry and Kevin Durant quietly negotiating time with the ball and then Klay Thompson firing up any possible shot left over.
The only realistic move would have been to have given one of their two-way contracts to Nunn. These were held by Alfonzo McKinnie, Damion Lee and Marcus Derrickson. We’ve already discussed how Lee was ahead of Nunn. McKinnie actually got a noticeable number of playoff minutes, so despite lots of Warriors fan complaints, he was a contributor.
Marcus Derrickson is a 6-7, 249 lb big wing who hustles hard and can hit the three pointer (10-20 on 3s in 11 GSW games in some thrilling small sample size). We didn’t see much of Derrickson in the big leagues, so it’s easy in hindsight to say Nunn should have gotten his spot.
But for size and defense reasons, Nunn was always going to have an uphill battle to get a spot in GSW (more below). So, this would be at best for the role of backup to Damion Lee, who was backing up Quinn Cook, who was backing up Shaun Livingston, who was backing up Stephen Curry. We’re talking about backup to a player who didn’t even make the playoff roster. And a third backup point guard who can’t play next to Steph Curry… that is too inflexible for Steve Kerr.
Derrickson on the other hand would fill the roles of bruiser stretch power forward and wing, which could slot in backing up Draymond Green and Andre Iguodala. So, this looks like the wrong move in retrospect, since Derrickson got shed anyway in the 2019 offseason, and Nunn might have cooked in the 2019-20 horror movie of injuries, but it was understandable. From the Sun-Sentinel:
If there is a bitterness about being left to toil last season with the Santa Cruz Warriors, it is not visible.
“I felt pretty close with the Golden State organization, if it was going to see games during the year, or them coming down, seeing us,” said Nunn.
3. Size, Efficiency and Defense
Okay, let’s get to the reason that everyone is too polite to say. Yes, Nunn can heat up and get you difficult buckets. Yes, he can fill up the basket in volume. But there is more to the game.
Kendrick Nunn is 6’ 2”. Steve Kerr doesn’t like small guards. He tolerates 6’ 3” Stephen Curry because he can shoot and is the best point guard in modern history. But Nunn’s size means he is going to be a liability on defense unless he improves immensely, and he can’t be flexed to play alongside Stephen Curry.
So Nunn can fill up the basket, and MIA is +2.5 net rating with him on-court. But off-court they’re an even better +4.7, giving him an On-Off of -2.2.
Advanced analytics hate Nunn. Despite the flashy year full of awards, his Offensive Box Plus Minus is -0.9, his Defensive BPM is -2.2, his Value Over Replacement Player is -0.1, so they rate him below a replacement player (a level of player one can find any time for a minimum contract).
Cleaning The Glass rates his defense as quite poor across the board for guards.
ESPN RPM rates Kendrick Nunn as the #51 shooting guard out of 137, with an offensive RPM of -0.32 (below average) and a defensive RPM of 0.04 (#45 in the league).
All of these measures are flawed, but they all point in a similar direction: Nunn is not good on defense and his offense is inefficient. So, despite his many talents, it’s not a slam dunk that he would fit on the 2018-19 Warriors.
Warriors Move Grade: C
To sum up. Nunn is a good player with some excellent scoring talent. 2019-20 Warriors would have loved to have him thrilling the crowds, filling up the bucket for a tanking team.
But 2018-19 GSW was going Championship or Bust, and there was no room for Nunn on the roster. From a dynasty point of view, keeping Nunn would not have affected the 2019 Warriors playoff run. Even in 2019-20, with all the new confidence in the world, Nunn has struggled terribly in the playoffs, with no rookie wall and no big road crowds.
From the point of view of post-dynasty play, arguably GSW should have kept him by giving him a two-way contract at the start of the season instead of Marcus Derrickson, or perhaps waiving Derrickson in spring to give Nunn a two-way instead.
However, at the time, for what Nunn showed, it was a reasonable call to let Nunn look for a contract elsewhere. And when one takes a closer look at what Nunn has been providing, we see a player with great promise, who still has some questions about his game and role when you look past the rookie awards.
Nunn himself is at peace with GSW:
“I understood the business part of it,” Nunn reflected. “They loved me as a player, that’s why the signed me on draft night. So, I was thankful there. But the business side of it was I didn’t get the call-up like I wanted to, and they were trying to work things out.”
Chris Boucher
Boucher and Jordan Bell were shot-blocking machines for the powerful Oregon Ducks NCAA team. But Boucher tore his ACL in March 2017 when a player fell on his leg. Jordan Bell slipped to the second round, as we have discussed at length, while Boucher went completely undrafted. This is understandable as torn ACLs tend to cost a player up to a whole year of recovery time and often they don’t get back to feeling normal until a year and a half later. Could a team in summer 2017 hang on to him long enough to see what he could become in September 2018?
The Warriors took a risk on him and signed him to one of the very first two-way contracts (just introduced in the NBA) on July 14 2017. He finally played for the Santa Cruz Warriors in January 2018, 9 months before he was supposed to be fully healed.
The Warriors announced on June 22 2018:
The 2018 NBA Champion Golden State Warriors have waived forward Chris Boucher, the team announced today. Boucher, who signed a two-way contract with the Warriors on July 14, 2017, appeared in one game for Golden State, making his NBA debut on March 14 vs. the Lakers. Boucher appeared in 20 games (eight starts) with the Santa Cruz Warriors in the NBA G League, posting averages of 11.8 points, 7.5 rebounds and 2.10 blocks in 22.2 minutes per game.
He had so-so numbers as he worked his way back from injury. Perhaps most importantly, he was already 25 years old. So the Warriors decided they needed the two-way contract spot for someone else who was more likely to help the team.
Bob Myers said, of the new two-way contract spots:
"We’re still learning about the position," Myers said. "What’s the best way to utilize it? I think we learned that, for our team, we might need more guys that can step in and less development. That’s what we kind of have to figure out."
The Warriors ended up using their two-way contracts in Fall 2018 on Damion Lee, Alfonzo McKinnie and Marcus Derrickson. The first two ended up playing significant minutes during the 2019 playoff run (for better or worse), more than Boucher likely would have.
Boucher got picked up by the Raptors who signed him to an Exhibit 10 on July 20 2018 and then a two-way on October 12 2018. At this point, this was a year and a half after the ACL tear, and Boucher was supposed to finally be himself. And he proceeded to tear up the G-League. The Raptors 905 bragged:
Raptors 905 forward Chris Boucher has been named the 2018-19 NBA G League Most Valuable Player and the 2018-19 NBA G League Defensive Player of the Year. He becomes the first player to win both awards in the same season. The Canadian is also the first international player to earn MVP honors.
Boucher (6-11, 200, Oregon), who signed a two-way contract with the Toronto Raptors last October before having it converted to a standard NBA contract in February, averaged 27.2 points, 11.4 rebounds and 4.1 blocked shots and shot 51.0 percent from the field in 28 games with Raptors 905. Among players who appeared in at least 28 games, Boucher ranked third in scoring, sixth in rebounding and first in blocks. Raptors 905 went 20-8 with him in the lineup and 29-21 overall.
TOR brought him up to the big leagues to end the 2018-19 season, where he played sparingly off the bench (5.8 minutes per game in 28 games, 4 Playoff Minutes).
In 2019-20, Boucher has steadily gained playing time and has played 12.9 MPG in 56 games. He’s shooting a chilly 28% from 3, but ESPN RPM likes him, rating him the #20 Power Forward in the league, though lower at #31 if you count playing time.
Boucher racked up 3.2 Win Shares this season and 0.6 Value Over Replacement Player. (Comparison Points: in 2018-19, Damion Lee had 0.7 WS, Alfonzo McKinnie had 2.1 WS, Jonas Jerebko had 3.3 WS).
And in the playoffs, Boucher chipped in 6.2 minutes per game across 7 games, mainly in garbage time, plus 4 Did Not Plays.
So Boucher still shows promise, and every time he has a highlight play, some Warriors fans gnash their teeth. But Boucher still has a lot to prove and he wasn’t going to contribute to the 2019 playoff run, so… you can’t hold on to every prospect forever, so the Warriors made a very reasonable move.
Warriors Move Grade: B
The Warriors drafted Boucher in Summer 2017 knowing he would be injured and subpar until Fall 2018. They ended up cutting him before Boucher could fully heal, seeing him as a prospect that was older, rehabbing a severe injury, and not doing well in the G-League, so not likely to contribute to the 2019 Playoffs in their Win Now mode. This is very likely true especially given that he didn’t contribute much in the *2020* playoffs either after his breakout.
History does support their judgment, as Boucher didn’t contribute much at the NBA level until the 2019-20 season. He’s now on track to be a good role player, so there is some regret, but I’m not sure the Warriors would do it differently, knowing this future.
3. How Well Did Other Dynasties Draft?
Too Long; Didn’t Read: Spoilers
I’m going to give you the big picture now, and give you the gory details over the next few days. In short, GSW actually did better at dynasty drafting than every other post-80s dynasty, with the possible exception of MIA 2011-2014.
Here are raw numbers of how many dynasty Playoff Minutes were played by the dynasty’s picks and also the players they added by trading the picks. These numbers are just for a quick overview and are an extremely blunt measure. To see the story behind the numbers, we’ll dig into each dynasty’s draft for the rest of the series.
By strict standards, GSW drafted better than BOS 1984-1987, though BOS drafted much better if you include 1980-1983. PHI 1980-1983 drafted better, due to one home run high pick. Also 1980s LAL drafted much better, epically well even. But the large part of the value from 1980s PHI, BOS and LAL drafts came from their high draft picks (lower than #8).
These great picks came from legendarily bad trades where the coaches and owners involved were usually kicked out of the league soon after. Even ignoring the worst malpractice, overall in the 1980s era, most teams didn’t properly value draft picks. That makes BOS and LAL far-sighted and brilliant. But it also means that the rest of the league caught up, and no dynasty since the 1980s got anywhere near such high draft picks (no dynasty has drafted better than #20 since then).
Now for the details.
Comparison Dynasty Guidelines
I investigated the whole meaning of Dynasty in a thorough article: The Warriors are the first true NBA dynasty (2018).
First, there must be dominance over significant time. How much time? There’s no accepted standard, but some data points: the Warriors were not considered a dynasty when they’d won 2 in 3 years; and “dynasty” is not consistently applied to two-time champion teams like the Hakeem Olajuwon Rockets or the Bad Boy Pistons. And frankly it seems a bit of a low standard to call a team that squeaks out a repeat championship a “dynasty”. So we will set our standard at 3+ championships, while winning the majority of possible championships over the span.
The NBA teams that fit this condition are:
1949-1954 Minneapolis Lakers (won 5 in 6 years)
1957-1969 Boston Celtics (10 in 12)
1985-1988 Los Angeles Lakers (3 in 4)
1991-1993 Chicago Bulls (3 in 3)
1996-1998 Chicago Bulls (3 in 3)
2000-2002 Los Angeles Lakers (3 in 3)
2003-2007 San Antonio Spurs (3 in 5)
2015-2018 Golden State Warriors (3 in 4)
For the sake of this series, I am going to use a more generous definition of Dynasty. Let’s look at every team that made the Finals 3+ times after 1980, advancing to the majority of possible finals over that span.
2015-2019 GSW
2015-2018 CLE
2011-2014 MIA
2008-2010 LAL
2003, 2005, 2007 SAS
2000-2002, 2004 LAL
1991-1993, 1996-1998 CHI
1988-1990 DET
1980, 1982-1983 PHI
1984-1987 BOS
1980, 1982-1984, 1987-1989, 1991 LAL
The reason for the looser definition is that all these teams faced Dynasty troubles by reigning over their conference. All modern NBA dynasties face the same problems: they draft very late for several years in a row and they are constrained by the salary cap from trading for high draft picks. The whole salary cap and draft / lottery system is built to erode and destroy dynasties.
How Do You Compare Dynasty Drafting?
I’ve mulled over different options for comparing how well teams draft, and how to measure player value, and have wrestled with these questions:
Which player performance measures are appropriate here? You could compute some all-in-one number like Win Shares or Value Over Replacement Player or BPM per 48 and sum up the total of draftees, or average such value per draft pick, or go harder and look at stats that incorporate plus/minus like RPM, PIPM, etc etc. These have different strengths and weaknesses and the hugest weakness for ALL of these are: (1) most advanced stats aren’t available before recent years and (2) they aren’t calculated separately for playoff performances.
How do you account for players that were injury-prone and only played some of the games? *cough* Looney *cough*.
Do you account for draftee performance compared to their peers, or to the expected value of the draft pick, or compared to who was available, or some other way?
How do you account for the value of picks that were traded to bring in veterans?
How do you account for prorating player value drafted later in the dynasty?
In the end, I came up with an elegantly simple measure of how well dynasty teams drafted. Simply count up the total number of minutes the draftees played in playoff games during the dynasty. For a rate measure, compute the number of playoff minutes per possible playoff game (including games they were DNP, not dressed, or injured… Yes, we punish players for not being available *cough* Looney *cough*).
Is this a perfect measure? Of course not. But it captures directly how much the team trusted them to play in the only setting that counts for a Dynasty, and how much they were available.
You could improve this by somehow accounting for the leverage of the minutes. But it’s not necessary, because — spoiler alert — frankly, almost all the dynasty drafts were really bad. We’re not coming up with a general player value. We are measuring how much value these teams got out of their picks when they are expecting to make the Finals and win everything. That comes down to how much players contribute in the Playoffs, and for role and bench players, that’s roughly proportional to how much they are allowed to play and available to play.
Now of course this blunt number won’t tell the whole story, so we will try to look at each draftee and give some context on their contributions. I will look at the Dynasty drafts starting with the draft after the first Finals, through the draft before the last Finals.
Measuring the Warriors Dynasty Drafts
Let’s establish the baseline and look at how the Warriors did by this measure.
We’ve just completed a study of how well the Warriors drafted during the Five Finals run. We saw the Warriors netted in four drafts:
2015
#30. Kevon Looney. Key starter/first bench big with major contributions in the 2018 and 2019 Playoffs. 819 minutes in 43 playoff games = 19.1 Playoff Minutes Per Game. We count the first two years that he missed, so that’s 819 min in 83 playoff games = 9.9 PMPG.
#60. Traded to IND in 2011 in the Brandon Rush - Louis Amundson trade.
2016
#30. Damian Jones. Athletic flashes, but very injury prone and inconsistent, leading to his being traded to make the D’Angelo Russell sign-and-trade possible. He was on the roster for 60 playoff games and played 40 minutes = 0.7 PMPG.
#38. Patrick McCaw. Occasional moments, including some nice spot minutes in the 2017 Finals, but wanted a bigger role and forced a trade. Pick acquired through cash considerations. He played 197 minutes in 38 playoff games = 5.2 PMPG
#60. Traded away in the Andre Iguodala sign-and-trade (for Andris Biedrins, Richard Jefferson, Brandon Rush, the 2014 1st, 2016 2nd, 2017 1st, 2017 2nd, 2018 2nd and cash).
2017
#38. Jordan Bell. Spectacular cult hero with key contributions in the 2018 HOU series, but overall a role player with minor impact. 279 Playoff Minutes in 43 playoff games = 6.49 PMPG.
#30 and #60. Iguodala trade (see above).
2018
#28. Jacob Evans. Never quite found his shot, was shifted to point guard, and then was traded to get out of luxury tax repeater penalty. 18 minutes in 22 playoff games = 0.8 PMPG.
#58. Iguodala trade (see above).
Warriors Summary
The Warriors in 4 drafts got Kevon Looney, Damian Jones, Patrick McCaw, Jordan Bell and Jacob Evans for a total of 1353 Playoff Minutes, and made the sign-and-trade for Andre Iguodala (2851 Playoff Minutes) possible.
The LeBron-Love-Kyrie Cleveland Cavaliers
How well did the Dynasty Cleveland Cavaliers draft?
This was LeBron James’s second superteam. Before the extended PR campaign to paint Kevin Love as No Help, Love was the top free agent of his class. The majority of people argued with a straight face that the Warriors should trade Draymond Green and Klay Thompson for Kevin Love. LeBron James also joined Kyrie Irving, one of the league’s best makers of tough inside shots.
CLE were the favorites to win in 2015 and for the foreseeable future… when some freak accident lifted the divergence value above 1.0 and jumped us into the alpha worldline, where the Warriors evolved and Stephen Curry leveled up into the greatest offensive attacker in history.
Nonetheless, the Cavs faced genuine Dynasty troubles, trying to maintain a top-flight team that cruised to the Finals every year in a demoralized Eastern Conference.
Let’s examine the drafting of the Eastern Dynasty Cavs.
2015
#24. Swapped to MIN for #31, #36 and 2019 2nd.
#31. Cedi Osman. Osman was claimed one spot after Kevon Looney. He has racked up a respectable amount of floor time, as a starting forward for the post-LeBron nuclear waste dump Cavaliers. However, for the Dynasty Cavs, he only played 62 Playoff Minutes.
He was #28 in Win Shares for this draft class, and #39 in Value Over Replacement Player (notably, at -1.2 he was rated as below replacement level).#36. Rakeem Christmas. Traded in summer to IND for a 2019 2nd.
#53. Sir'Dominic Pointer. Played one year in the D-League, then played overseas.
2016
#24. Traded for Kevin Love with Andrew Wiggins, Anthony Bennett, etc. in the mega-swap.
#26. Traded to DEN with 2017 #20 for Timothy Mozgov and 2015 #53.
#28. Traded to BOS in a massive salary dump to make space for LeBron James and Kevin Love.
#48. Traded for Luol Deng, who didn’t play for the Eastern Dynasty Cavs.
#54. Kay Felder. (Got pick for cash considerations from ATL.) Felder bounced around between the G-League and CLE as a bench player in 2016-17, then was traded to ATL as part of a dump of Richard Jefferson’s salary. He racked up the #53 Win Shares out of 54 draftees who played a single minute in the NBA.
#58. Traded in a complex pair of trades involving Keith Bogans between BOS, CLE and PHI in Sept 2014.
2017
#20. Traded to DEN for Timothy Mozgov, see 2016 #26.
#26. Traded to POR for 2018 1st.
#38. Traded in Luol Deng trade.
#53. Traded to BOS.
The Verdict
So, in three drafts, the Cavaliers netted
Cedi Osman and Kay Felder who together played (62 + 0) total playoff minutes, so essentially zero impact on the Cavaliers playoff runs.
They used plenty of draft picks to facilitate trades for
cornerstone Kevin Love;
half a great Finals from Timothy Mozgov, who played very well in the 2015 Finals before small ball made him obsolete mid-series, and he never played meaningful playoff minutes again for CLE until leaving as a free agent after the 2016 Finals;
Luol Deng who didn’t even play with LeBron
Part of the double-edged sword of LeBron James is that his constant threat to leave (via his 1+1 contracts) means you are constantly trading any medium-term strengths and the next generation to help LeBron win that year. Chop down all your forest and eat all your seed corn to go all-in. Once he’s gone, you have desolation for years.
So they drafted 62 Playoff Minutes, and, let’s be very generous with the trade credit here, traded for 2563 Playoff Minutes (Love and Mozgov).
The Warriors got a LOT more out of draftees (1353 Playoff Minutes) and even if you give 100% credit to the traded picks for sign-and-trades, GSW also got comparable minutes out of their draft trades (Andre’s 2851 Playoff Minutes compared to Love and Mozgov’s combined (2563 PM).
Verdict: The Warriors Dynasty drafted much better than the Cavaliers Dynasty.
The LeBron-Wade-Bosh Miami Heat
How well did the Dynasty Miami Heat draft?
This original LeBron superteam dominated the Eastern Conference from 2011 through 2014, after assembling the top two free agents, LeBron James and Chris Bosh, with Dwayne Wade. Perhaps a disappointment due to their dud of a first Finals (losing to Dirk Nowitzki’s Mavericks) and the whimper end of the fourth Finals (losing to the Kill Bill Revenge Spurs).
Let’s examine the Miami Heat dynasty drafts.
2011
#28. Norris Cole. This was a solid draft pick. He played lots of regular season minutes at the backup point guard and solid minutes off the bench in the playoffs after the first year. In Win Shares, he ranked #35 in his draft class, and #54 — dead last among all in his draft class that played NBA minutes — in Value Over Replacement Player. So, quite frankly, advanced stats hate him. Nonetheless, his big minutes show he was playing a significant regular role for the team. He played 992 Playoff Minutes in 62 games.
#31. Traded to MIN with 2014 2nd and cash for #28.
#58. Traded to LAL in 2009 for 2009 #42 (who turned out to be Patrick Beverley!)
2012
#27. Traded to PHI for #45 and PHI future 1st.
#45. Justin Hamilton. Played a handful of games in 2013-2015 and zero playoff minutes.
#57. Traded to BRK for future 2nd.
2013
#30. Traded in LeBron James sign-and-trade.
#50. James Ennis. This was a sneaky great draft pick, but MIA either didn’t know what they had, or didn’t know how to use it. Ennis is #17 in his draft class for Win Shares and #22 in VORP. But most of this came for other teams.
Because of using up the salary cap elsewhere, MIA could not sign him to a minimum salary and Ennis didn’t want to play for a D-League salary, so he played in Australia and Puerto Rico for a year. Then MIA signed him properly for 2014-15, but by then LeBron had already used up all the team’s resources and moved on to the next town. The result is Ennis played 0 Playoff Minutes for MIA.#60. Minor trade to MEM.
The Verdict
In the master series post, I discussed how I considered a range of options for comparing how well Dynasty teams drafted. came up with a simple measure of how well dynasty teams drafted. Simply count up the total number of minutes the draftees played in playoff games.
Is this a perfect measure? Of course not. But it captures directly how much the team trusted them to play in the most important setting, and how much they were available.
So the Miami Heat in 3 drafts got 3 players, 2 of whom played 0 Playoff Minutes Per Game, and Cole who played 992 Playoff Minutes and 16.0 PMPG, but at an efficiency hated by advanced stats.
The Warriors in 4 drafts got Kevon Looney, Damian Jones, Patrick McCaw, Jordan Bell and Jacob Evans for a total of 1353 Playoff Minutes, and made the sign-and-trade for Andre Iguodala (2851 Playoff Minutes) possible.
One could make an argument either way. Perhaps MIA got better value by getting one player who played 16.0 Playoff Minutes Per Game. Or maybe GSW got better value by getting three players who contributed almost 1300 Playoff Minutes. Or maybe GSW got better value because Kevon Looney didn’t take up a playoff roster spot his first two years and then played 19.1 PMPG his last two years, being an even bigger contributor than Cole.
Looking at trades, maybe MIA got more value for the draft picks by facilitating the LeBron sign and trade because, well he’s LeBron. Or maybe GSW got more value from facilitating Andre Iguodala’s trade, since that sign-and-trade was very very close to not happening, with Andre set to go elsewhere up to the last minute. In contrast, it was an absolute certainty that LeBron was coming, so the LeBron trade was just haggling for value.
I can see these arguments, so I’d argue that the values are roughly in the same neighborhood. The drafts facilitated a key star coming, and also cashed in one key role player. I think GSW got more value from other players (Jordan Bell, Patrick McCaw) drafted as well.
Verdict: We judge the Warriors Dynasty drafted slightly better than the Heat Dynasty, but would respectfully hear out arguments we that the Heat drafted better.
Postscript.
In response to Truckeeman’s comment I wrote:
FYI, every GSW draft pick’s advanced stats are given in their individual reviews in Parts 1-5.
But since Cole is the only comp that I flagged for advanced stats, here it is in one spot. Let’s do Win Shares since Cole is a bit better there. I’ll also update the Warrior pick ranks since the series was written last year.
Cole, #35 rank by Win Shares in draft class
Looney, #13 (#17 now)
McCaw, #24 (#23 now)
Jones, #25 (#19 now)
Bell, #17 (#21 now)
Evans, #40 (#56 last now)
The Shaq-Kobe and Kobe-Pau Lakers
How well did the Dynasty Kobe-Pau Lakers draft?
This was Kobe’s second Dynasty (and Phil Jackson’s fourth). Kobe Bryant demanded a trade from the Lakers, feeling they were putzing away his prime by slowly building around Andrew Bynum. The Lakers shocked the NBA by somehow trading, essentially, Kwame Brown for Pau Gasol. (A decade later, that trade actually seems pretty fair, as the Grizzlies also landed Marc Gasol, but at the time he was some random draft-and-stash and Pau’s little brother.) This launched a three Finals run from 2008 (steamrolled by the Big 3 Boston Celtics), 2009 (whacking the Dwight Howard Orlando Magic), and 2010 (squeaking out a Game 7 thriller over the Big 3 Celtics).
Let’s look at the drafts.
2008
#28. Traded to MEM to acquire Pau Gasol.
#58. Joe Crawford. He was waived after pre-season and sent to the D-League, and moved on to the Knicks.
2009
#29. Toney Douglas, but traded to NYK for a 2011 2nd and cash.
#42. Patrick Beverley. He’s made a name for himself with hustle and hard work and being damned annoying, but LAL traded him on draft night to Miami for a 2011 2nd and cash.
#59. Chinemelu Elonu. A draft-and-stash in Spain. Elonu wouldn’t play for the Lakers until 2012 Summer League, and never got NBA minutes.
2010
#28. Traded to MEM to acquire Pau Gasol.
#43. Devin Ebanks. Sent to the D-League and didn’t play any real minutes for LAL until 2011 after the championship window closed.
#58. Derrick Caracter. Also sent to the D-League and never played real minutes for the Dynasty Lakers.
The Verdict
I believe the team was so loaded up on salary that they didn’t think they could pay for marginal players in their lineup, thus explaining the complete punting on the 2009 draft. The most important outcome of the drafts was that two draft picks allowed them to acquire Pau Gasol (2680 Playoff Minutes for the Dynasty Lakers). Six players were drafted and none of them played meaningful minutes, even in the regular season, for the Dynasty.
The Warriors used Dynasty-era draft picks to acquire key player Andre Iguodala (2851 Playoff Minutes). But they also landed Kevon Looney who eventually was an important role player, and Jordan Bell, Patrick McCaw and Damian Jones who ultimately disappointed but played important spot minutes in the playoffs.
Verdict: The Warriors drafted better than the Kobe-Pau Lakers.
That was so easy and fast, let’s also consider the Shaq-Kobe Lakers in this article.
How well did the Dynasty Shaq-Kobe Lakers draft?
This dynasty clicked immediately with Phil Jackson and ran off three championships in 2000, 2001 and 2002. In 2003 they were tripped up by the Spurs, but came back in 2004 with Karl Malone and Gary Payton to make another Finals where they got thumped by a great defensive Pistons team.
2000
#29. Mark Madsen. He contributed a token 227 Playoff Minutes in 57 games for 4.0 Playoff Minutes Per Game (reference: less than Jordan Bell or Patrick McCaw).
#54. Cory Hightower. This is an odd case where the Lakers shelled out two future 2nd round picks to SAS to grab Hightower, so they clearly loved him. But then they cut him after Summer League and he played for the CBA and then the Harlem Globetrotters and never played in the NBA.
2001
#27. Traded to NYK early in the 2000-01 season as part of dumping Glen Rice and Travis Knight and receiving Horace Grant, Greg Foster, Emanual Davis and Chuck Person. Horace Grant was a contributor to the 2000-01 LAL, starting as PF all season. Obviously, Phil Jackson valued Grant’s expertise in the triangle offense from their Bulls days. But they got just the one good year, as Grant left as a free agent the next season after tallying 423 Playoff Minutes in 16 games.
#56. Traded to SAS in the Hightower trade.
2002
#20. Kareem Rush. Ended up as #28 in Win Shares for his draft class, and #46 in Value Over Replacement Player. Even though he was hated by advanced stats, he carved out a career as a role player and contributed a respectable 12.2 Playoff Minutes Per Game, 379 Playoff Minutes in 31 games.
#27. Traded to TOR for #20, also getting Tracy Murray and 2003 2nd for Lindsey Hunter and 2003 2nd.
#56. Traded to SAS in the Hightower trade. (SAS picked some guy named Luis Scola, who only turned out to be one of the great international players for years and #8 in Win Shares for his draft class. What a steal… but not for the Lakers.)
2003
#24. Brian Cook. A backup big who played minor minutes. He played garbage time minutes in the 2003-04 playoffs, but hung around long enough to contribute a few minutes to the playoff runs before the Kobe-Pau Dynasty (78 then 51). For the Dynasty Years, he totaled 46 Playoff Minutes in 22 games for 2.1 PMPG.
#32. Luke Walton. This underrated player hung around long enough to contribute spot minutes for the Shaq-Kobe Dynasty (134 Playoff Minutes in 22 games for 6.1 PMPG) and then again for the Kobe-Pau Dynasty (781 Playoff Minutes in 67 games for 11.7 PMPG). This prepared him for his eventual destiny of leading the 2015-16 Warriors to their blazing 24-0 start while Steve Kerr was injured.
#52. Traded to TOR (see 2002 #27 trade).
The Verdict
In four drafts, LAL drafted five players who played a total of 786 Playoff Minutes for the Shaq-Kobe Dynasty. They also used draft picks to trade for one year of Horace Grant, who was a major contributor to the 2001 championship, chipping in 423 Playoff Minutes in 16 games (26.4 PMPG).
In four drafts, the Warriors got Kevon Looney, Damian Jones, Patrick McCaw, Jordan Bell and Jacob Evans for a total of 1353 Playoff Minutes, and made the sign-and-trade for Andre Iguodala (2851 Playoff Minutes) possible.
Even if you include the minutes Luke Walton played for the next dynasty four years later (781 Playoff Minutes), you get 1567 Playoff Minutes, which is in the same ballpark as the Warriors net. And Horace Grant was important, but not as important as Andre Iguodala.
Verdict. The Warriors drafted better than the Shaq-Kobe Dynasty Lakers.
The Dynasty Spurs, the Raid Boss
How well did the Dynasty Spurs draft?
Well folks, this is the Raid Boss of drafting teams. We all know the Spurs have crushed the draft despite many years of excellence and (therefore) late picks.
The only way to avoid them is to say they weren’t really a dynasty. This is not as silly as it sounds, because amazingly they never won back-to-back titles. In fact, they never even made back-to-back finals, until the famous Salty Runback of 2014. Before that, the Spurs had four Finals defenses, which resulted in a 1st round loss, two 2nd round losses, and a gentleman’s sweep in the WCF, so they’ve never even been remotely close to back-to-back. So by the common definitions of dynasty, the Spurs were not a dynasty.
Nonetheless, that is a coward’s way out, because we know they have been consistently excellent. Instead, let us face them head on, to see how the best drafters in NBA history drafted during their Dynasty years. (Indeed, I picked my looser definition of Dynasty partly in order to include the Spurs.)
From 2003-2007, SAS won the majority of finals. This is their only stretch of dense Finals activity, with SAS winning it all in 2003, 2005 and 2007, getting whacked in 2004 in the second round by LAL, and getting whacked again in 2006 in the second round by Dirk Nowitzki’s Mavs.
SAS was legendary for pioneering international scouting, and they found fantastic player after fantastic player deep in the draft. In the 2000s, international players were widely considered unathletic and soft in NBA circles and SAS really made bank for the whole decade off this ignorant prejudice. They also aggressively collected late draft picks and got the rights to boom-or-bust international players, the “draft-and-stash” maneuver. With this drafting advantage, they stole Goran Dragic, Tiago Splitter, Ian Mahinmi, Beno Udrih, Luis Scola, Tony Parker and Manu Ginobili. By the 2010s, other teams had caught on to this, and the Spurs have since looked elsewhere for their draft advantages.
So brace yourselves, and let’s see how The Raid Boss drafted during the 2003-2007 Dynasty.
2003
#28. Traded to PHX for 2005 #30.
#58. Traded to DET for Mengke Bateer. Bateer played 46 minutes for SAS and none in the playoffs.
2004
#28. Beno Udrih. A great choice. In his draft class, he ranked #15 in Win Shares and #18 in Value Over Replacement Player. However, notably, he did most of his damage in the league after leaving SAS. For SAS, he averaged 13.0 MPG in the regular season and was salary dumped to MIN after three seasons. He was waived and only exploded after going to SAC to be a steady starting PG.
For SAS though, he clocked in 308 Playoff Minutes in 56 games = 5.5 Playoff Minutes Per Game#42. Viktor Sanikidze. Acquired from ATL for 2005 2nd and cash. Draft and stash that never reached the NBA.
#52. Romain Sato. Acquired from MEM for Gordan Giricek rights. Draft and stash that never reached the NBA.
#57. Sergei Karaulov. Draft and stash that never reached the NBA.
2005
#28. Ian Mahinmi. This was a mega-draft-and-stash. Wikipedia says the pick “surprised many other teams and league officials because he wasn't among the 128 players listed in the league's draft guide. Mahinmi was considered a ‘project’ that would be a couple of years from competing in the NBA.” He eventually joined the team for the 2007-08 season for 23 minutes and 18 Playoff Minutes, but this was too late to qualify for time with the Dynasty. Indeed, he actually carved out a solid long NBA career! Just not for SAS.
#30. Traded to NYK with 2006 1st and Malik Rose for Nazr Mohammed and Jamison Brewer. Brewer was waived immediately. Mohammed was a big, bruising, sturdy bench player for SAS, playing 17.5 minutes per game across 103 games in 2 seasons. He played 622 Playoff Minutes for a very respectable 17.3 Playoff Minutes Per Game. However, SAS benched Mohammed for the end of the 2006 playoffs, and as a result, he turned down the Spurs contract extension and left to start for DET.
#59. Traded to ATL (see 2004 #42).
2006
#29. Traded to NYK (see 2005 #30)
#59. Traded to MIL for 2007 2nd.
The Verdict
Well, what the heck happened? I honestly was expecting SAS to smack down the Warriors. Instead, in four drafts the Spurs drafted seven players: five didn’t make the NBA, Mahinmi did but after the Dynasty ended, and Udrih played spot minutes for 308 Playoff Minutes at 5.5 PMPG. Let’s generously count Mohammed as a result of a draft pick, and he contributes 622 Playoff Minutes at 17.3 PMPG. That’s a total of 930 Playoff Minutes drafted. They traded picks for Mohammed and two players who never played playoff minutes.
In four drafts, the Warriors got Kevon Looney, Damian Jones, Patrick McCaw, Jordan Bell and Jacob Evans for a total of 1353 Playoff Minutes, and made the sign-and-trade for Andre Iguodala (2851 Playoff Minutes) possible.
Kevon Looney (819 Playoff Minutes) contributed more than Nazr Mohammed, and they both were only available for two years. Udrih contributed an amount comparable to Jordan Bell (279 Playoff Minutes, 6.5 PMPG), and arguably Bell played higher leverage minutes. Then on top of that, the Warriors grabbed McCaw and Jones and made the Iguodala sign-and-trade.
Verdict: I can’t believe I’m writing this, but the Dynasty Warriors clearly drafted better than the Dynasty Spurs. I may need to go back and check my numbers. What is going on???
I guess the real lesson is that even if you are the best late pick drafters in history, it’s still a rough task to get dynasty playoff help from the draft.
the links to this dont work anymore
trump needs quit kissing hitler erdogan's butt...oops, sorry, wrong thread....but, yeah, i agree with sleepy, that was one hell of a trade that got us andre and got rid of those two stiffs...hi, guys...bubble gum bball is on...we just averted a war between greeks and turks where i am at...for the time being, anyway....hope everyone made it through virus ok...stay safe...