Dynasty Drafts: the Warriors vs the rest (Spurs, Lakers, Bulls, Pistons, Sixers, Lakers, Celtics); & open thread
Dynasty Drafts: the Warriors vs the rest (Spurs, Lakers, Bulls, Pistons, Sixers, Lakers, Celtics); & open thread
Finishing off the series
We laid out the constraints and boundaries of this analysis in the series master post, How the Warriors Extended The Dynasty Through The Draft, an in-depth series. This also has links to all the articles in the series.
All modern NBA dynasties face the same problems: they draft very late for several years in a row and they are constrained by the salary cap from trading for high draft picks. The whole salary cap and draft / lottery system is built to erode and destroy dynasties.
How well did the Dynasty Spurs draft?
Well folks, this is the Raid Boss of drafting teams. We all know the Spurs have crushed the draft despite many years of excellence and (therefore) late picks.
The only way to avoid them is to say they weren’t really a dynasty. This is not as silly as it sounds, because amazingly they never won back-to-back titles. In fact, they never even made back-to-back finals, until the famous Salty Runback of 2014. Before that, the Spurs had four Finals defenses, which resulted in a 1st round loss, two 2nd round losses, and a gentleman’s sweep in the WCF, so they’ve never even been remotely close to back-to-back. So by the common definitions of dynasty, the Spurs were not a dynasty. In fact, many people have argued exactly this.
Nonetheless, that is a coward’s way out, because we know they have been consistently excellent. Instead, let us face them head on, to see how the best drafters in NBA history drafted during their Dynasty years. (Indeed, I picked my looser definition of Dynasty partly in order to include the Spurs.)
From 2003-2007, SAS won the majority of finals. This is their only stretch of dense Finals activity, with SAS winning it all in 2003, 2005 and 2007, getting whacked in 2004 in the second round by LAL, and getting whacked again in 2006 in the second round by Dirk Nowitzki’s Mavs.
SAS was legendary for pioneering international scouting, and they found fantastic player after fantastic player deep in the draft. In the 2000s, international players were widely considered unathletic and soft in NBA circles and SAS really made bank for the whole decade off this ignorant prejudice. They also aggressively collected late draft picks and got the rights to boom-or-bust international players, the “draft-and-stash” maneuver. With this drafting advantage, they stole Goran Dragic, Tiago Splitter, Ian Mahinmi, Beno Udrih, Luis Scola, Tony Parker and Manu Ginobili. By the 2010s, other teams had caught on to this, and the Spurs have since looked elsewhere for their draft advantages.
So brace yourselves, and let’s see how The Raid Boss drafted during the 2003-2007 Dynasty.
2003
#28. Traded to PHX for 2005 #30.
#58. Traded to DET for Mengke Bateer. Bateer played 46 minutes for SAS and none in the playoffs.
2004
#28. Beno Udrih. A great choice. In his draft class, he ranked #15 in Win Shares and #18 in Value Over Replacement Player. However, notably, he did most of his damage in the league after leaving SAS. For SAS, he averaged 13.0 MPG in the regular season and was salary dumped to MIN after three seasons. He was waived and only exploded after going to SAC to be a steady starting PG.
For SAS though, he clocked in 308 Playoff Minutes in 56 games = 5.5 Playoff Minutes Per Game#42. Viktor Sanikidze. Acquired from ATL for 2005 2nd and cash. Draft and stash that never reached the NBA.
#52. Romain Sato. Acquired from MEM for Gordan Giricek rights. Draft and stash that never reached the NBA.
#57. Sergei Karaulov. Draft and stash that never reached the NBA.
2005
#28. Ian Mahinmi. This was a mega-draft-and-stash. Wikipedia says the pick “surprised many other teams and league officials because he wasn't among the 128 players listed in the league's draft guide. Mahinmi was considered a ‘project’ that would be a couple of years from competing in the NBA.” He eventually joined the team for the 2007-08 season for 23 minutes and 18 Playoff Minutes, but this was too late to qualify for time with the Dynasty. Indeed, he actually carved out a solid long NBA career! Just not for SAS.
#30. Traded to NYK with 2006 1st and Malik Rose for Nazr Mohammed and Jamison Brewer. Brewer was waived immediately. Mohammed was a big, bruising, sturdy bench player for SAS, playing 17.5 minutes per game across 103 games in 2 seasons. He played 622 Playoff Minutes for a very respectable 17.3 Playoff Minutes Per Game. However, SAS benched Mohammed for the end of the 2006 playoffs, and as a result, he turned down the Spurs contract extension and left to start for DET.
#59. Traded to ATL (see 2004 #42).
2006
#29. Traded to NYK (see 2005 #30)
#59. Traded to MIL for 2007 2nd.
Evaluating the Drafts
In the master series post, I considered a range of options for comparing how well Dynasty teams drafted, and came up with a simple measure: simply count up the total number of minutes the draftees played in playoff games.
Is this a perfect measure? Of course not. But it captures directly how much the team trusted them to play in the only setting that counts for a Dynasty, and how much they were available. Doesn’t this advantage teams whose Dynasty lasted longer? YES. That’s not a bug, it’s a feature. If your draft is part of a process that leads to a longer Dynasty, that is better drafting.
The Verdict
Well, what the heck happened? I honestly was expecting SAS to smack down the Warriors. Instead, in four drafts the Spurs drafted seven players: five didn’t make the NBA, Mahinmi did but after the Dynasty ended, and Udrih played spot minutes for 308 Playoff Minutes at 5.5 PMPG. Let’s generously count Mohammed as a result of a draft pick, and he contributes 622 Playoff Minutes at 17.3 PMPG. That’s a total of 930 Playoff Minutes drafted. They traded picks for Mohammed and two players who never played playoff minutes.
In the 2015-2019 Dynasty Run, in four drafts, the Warriors got Kevon Looney, Damian Jones, Patrick McCaw, Jordan Bell and Jacob Evans for a total of 1353 Playoff Minutes, and made the sign-and-trade for Andre Iguodala (2851 Playoff Minutes) possible.
Kevon Looney (819 Playoff Minutes) contributed more than Nazr Mohammed, and they both were only available for two years. Udrih contributed an amount comparable to Jordan Bell (279 Playoff Minutes, 6.5 PMPG), and arguably Bell played higher leverage minutes. Then on top of that, the Warriors grabbed McCaw and Jones and made the Iguodala sign-and-trade.
Considering the full 2015-2022 Dynasty drafting makes the difference even greater.
Verdict: I can’t believe I’m writing this, but the Dynasty Warriors clearly drafted better than the Dynasty Spurs. I may need to go back and check my numbers. What is going on???
I guess the real lesson is that even if you are the best late pick drafters in history, it’s still a rough task to get dynasty playoff help from the draft.
I had a very interesting back and forth with ForeverFoyled on the issue of whether the entire 1999-2014 period should count as a dynasty for the Spurs, and in particular whether 1999-2002 should count, which I excluded. In these drafts SAS grabbed Manu Ginobili, Tony Parker, and Luis Scola which is an epic stretch to exclude.
ForeverFoyled:
The tricky thing with the Spurs is when the dynasty began/ended. If you start after their first finals win of the "Duncan era" and go until their last, then you include Parker, Manu, Kawhi, which I presume would blow everyone else (other than maybe showtime Lakers) out of the water. I realize that over the long 1999-2014 span they don't meet the 50% finals criteria, and you need some criteria to base it on. But it just doesn't quite feel representative of how that dynasty is generally viewed (ie lasting more than 4 years).
Apricot:
I agree it is tricky. But I am at peace with my approach, because I'm trying to study dynasty drafting, not skilled general drafting..
When people were crushing GSW for bad drafting that ruined the dynasty, they didn't count drafting Steph, Klay, Dray as great GSW dynasty drafting. They wanted to see great drafting AFTER the dynasty started that maintained it.
In the same way, we should not count Spurs drafting Duncan/Manu/Parker as *dynasty* drafting. And in fact, I was surprised to see that they *spoiler alert* got almost nothing in their draft to sustain dynastic level success.
Kawhi is the best example of extending the dynasty, but honestly they fell off their peak for a while before Kawhi came in.
ForeverFoyled:
Right but the Spurs won in 1999 and were a top team ever since (no high draft picks). So I think many would say the Spurs dynasty started after they won in 99, like the Warriors started after they won 2015. I get there has to be some cutoff though, and due to meeting Shaq Lakers they went a few years without a finals. But it's also a bit weird that if Spurs had made it to and lost one more finals between 2000-2008, then that would have magically qualified Manu and Parker as dynasty picks when they aren't now.
Apricot:
I am taking your point seriously, so let me look at the Spurs record from 1999… pulling up BBR: https://www.basketball-reference.com/teams/SAS/
1999. Title, famously called “asterisk” by Phil Jackson for the shortened year
2000. Lost in 1st round
2001. Lost in WCF (0-4 sweep!!)
2002. Lost in 2nd round (1-4!!)
In my opinion, you can’t call that a dynasty. And in 2003 nobody was calling it a dynasty either. Fairly or not, in 2003, they were known as just the team that lucked into the one title and never got near the Finals again.
Additional thought. (You can tell you hit something interesting! I thought about this a lot while deciding on the dynasties.)
The Toronto Raptors won the title in 2019. In the three years after, they won 3 post-first-round games. (The Spurs won 5 post-first-round games in the three years after 1999.)
If TOR start winning titles again, are we really going to say their drafting Scottie Barnes extended the dynasty? No, they aren’t anywhere close to a dynasty now. We would say, they started a dynasty.
And honestly, no one would call them a dynasty even if they won this year either. It would probably take… AHEM… going to a majority of finals in a span of time.
And they are today where the Spurs were in 2003.
Thanks for the super interesting thoughts.
How well did the Dynasty Kobe-Pau Lakers draft?
This was Kobe’s second Dynasty (and Phil Jackson’s fourth). Kobe Bryant demanded a trade from the Lakers, feeling they were putzing away his prime by slowly building around Andrew Bynum. The Lakers shocked the NBA by somehow trading, essentially, Kwame Brown for Pau Gasol. (A decade later, that trade actually seems pretty fair, as the Grizzlies also landed Marc Gasol, but at the time he was some random draft-and-stash and Pau’s little brother.) This launched a three Finals run from 2008 (steamrolled by the Big 3 Boston Celtics), 2009 (whacking the Dwight Howard Orlando Magic), and 2010 (squeaking out a Game 7 thriller over the Big 3 Celtics).
Let’s look at the drafts.
2008
#28. Traded to MEM to acquire Pau Gasol.
#58. Joe Crawford. He was waived after pre-season and sent to the D-League, and moved on to the Knicks.
2009
#29. Toney Douglas, but traded to NYK for a 2011 2nd and cash.
#42. Patrick Beverley. He’s made a name for himself with hustle and hard work and being damned annoying, but LAL traded him on draft night to Miami for a 2011 2nd and cash.
#59. Chinemelu Elonu. A draft-and-stash in Spain. Elonu wouldn’t play for the Lakers until 2012 Summer League, and never got NBA minutes.
2010
#28. Traded to MEM to acquire Pau Gasol.
#43. Devin Ebanks. Sent to the D-League and didn’t play any real minutes for LAL until 2011 after the championship window closed.
#58. Derrick Caracter. Also sent to the D-League and never played real minutes for the Dynasty Lakers.
Evaluating the Drafts
In the master series post, I considered a range of options for comparing how well Dynasty teams drafted, and came up with a simple measure: simply count up the total number of minutes the draftees played in playoff games.
Is this a perfect measure? Of course not. But it captures directly how much the team trusted them to play in the only setting that counts for a Dynasty, and how much they were available. Doesn’t this advantage teams whose Dynasty lasted longer? YES. That’s not a bug, it’s a feature. If your draft is part of a process that leads to a longer Dynasty, that is better drafting.
The Verdict
I believe the LAL team was so loaded up on salary that they didn’t think they could pay for marginal players in their lineup, thus explaining the complete punting on the 2009 draft. The most important outcome of the drafts was that two draft picks allowed them to acquire Pau Gasol (2680 Playoff Minutes for the Dynasty Lakers). Six players were drafted and none of them played meaningful minutes, even in the regular season, for the Dynasty.
Even comparing JUST to the 2015-2019 Warriors drafts and Playoffs, the Warriors used Dynasty-era draft picks to acquire key player Andre Iguodala (2851 Playoff Minutes). But they also landed Kevon Looney who eventually was an important role player, and Jordan Bell, Patrick McCaw and Damian Jones who ultimately disappointed but played important spot minutes in the playoffs.
Considering the full GSW dynasty, it’s not even close.
Verdict: The Warriors drafted better than the Kobe-Pau Lakers.
How well did the Dynasty Shaq-Kobe Lakers draft?
This dynasty clicked immediately with Phil Jackson and ran off three championships in 2000, 2001 and 2002. In 2003 they were tripped up by the Spurs, but came back in 2004 with Karl Malone and Gary Payton to make another Finals where they got thumped by a great defensive Pistons team.
2000
#29. Mark Madsen. He contributed a token 227 Playoff Minutes in 57 games for 4.0 Playoff Minutes Per Game (reference: less than Jordan Bell or Patrick McCaw).
#54. Cory Hightower. This is an odd case where the Lakers shelled out two future 2nd round picks to SAS to grab Hightower, so they clearly loved him. But then they bizarrely cut him after Summer League and he played for the CBA and then the Harlem Globetrotters and never played in the NBA.
2001
#27. Traded to NYK early in the 2000-01 season as part of dumping Glen Rice and Travis Knight and receiving Horace Grant, Greg Foster, Emanual Davis and Chuck Person. Horace Grant was a contributor to the 2000-01 LAL, starting as PF all season. Obviously, Phil Jackson valued Grant’s expertise in the triangle offense from their Bulls days. But they got just the one good year, as Grant left as a free agent the next season after tallying 423 Playoff Minutes in 16 games.
#56. Traded to SAS in the Hightower trade.
2002
#20. Kareem Rush. Ended up as #28 in Win Shares for his draft class, and #46 in Value Over Replacement Player. Even though he was hated by advanced stats, he carved out a career as a role player and contributed a respectable 12.2 Playoff Minutes Per Game, 379 Playoff Minutes in 31 games.
#27. Traded to TOR for #20, also getting Tracy Murray and 2003 2nd for Lindsey Hunter and 2003 2nd.
#56. Traded to SAS in the Hightower trade. (SAS picked some guy named Luis Scola, who only turned out to be one of the great international players and #8 in Win Shares for his draft class. What a steal… but not for the Lakers.)
2003
#24. Brian Cook. A backup big who played minor minutes. He played garbage time minutes in the 2003-04 playoffs, but hung around long enough to contribute a few minutes to the playoff runs before the Kobe-Pau Dynasty (78 then 51). For the Dynasty Years, he totaled 46 Playoff Minutes in 22 games for 2.1 PMPG.
#32. Luke Walton. This underrated player hung around long enough to contribute spot minutes for the Shaq-Kobe Dynasty (134 Playoff Minutes in 22 games for 6.1 PMPG) and then again for the Kobe-Pau Dynasty (781 Playoff Minutes in 67 games for 11.7 PMPG). This prepared him for his eventual destiny of leading the 2015-16 Warriors to their blazing 24-0 start while Steve Kerr was injured.
#52. Traded to TOR (see 2002 #27 trade).
The Verdict
In four drafts, LAL drafted five players who played a total of 786 Playoff Minutes for the Shaq-Kobe Dynasty. They also used draft picks to trade for one year of Horace Grant, who was a major contributor to the 2001 championship, chipping in 423 Playoff Minutes in 16 games (26.4 PMPG).
In just the 2015-2019 Dynasty run, the Warriors got Kevon Looney, Damian Jones, Patrick McCaw, Jordan Bell and Jacob Evans for a total of 1353 Playoff Minutes, and made the sign-and-trade for Andre Iguodala (2851 Playoff Minutes) possible.
Even if you include the minutes Luke Walton played for the next dynasty four years later (781 Playoff Minutes), you get 1567 Playoff Minutes, which is in the same ballpark as the Warriors net. And Horace Grant was important, but not as important as Andre Iguodala.
Again, the full GSW dynasty through 2022 makes this contest even more lopsided.
Verdict. The Warriors drafted better than the Shaq-Kobe Dynasty Lakers.
How well did the Dynasty Bulls draft?
There is some technical question about whether to count the Bulls as two dynasties 1991-1993 and 1996-1998. To be generous to CHI, I’m counting it all as one, so that we will count the 1993, 1994 and 1995 drafts which would be ignored the other way.
Jerry Krause has become a bit of a punching bag, especially after getting blamed in The Last Dance for breaking up the dynasty. Perhaps he bears a lot of the blame for the end, but he also gets credit for the beginning. It was his vision that complemented Michael Jordan with his draft pick Scottie Pippen and his handpicked coach Phil Jackson and his handpicked assistant Tex Winter and his handpicked offense, the Triangle Offense.
Before these moves, MJ was known as the Biggest Loser: supremely talented, but couldn’t make a team better. You know, all the usual results-driven pat analysis.
So let’s look at Krause’s drafts as the Bulls tried to continue their dynasty.
1991
#26. Mark Randall. He played 67 minutes in 15 games for CHI before getting traded to MIN.
#53. Traded to NJN with the 1990 1st and 1992 2nd for Dennis Hopson in 1990. Hopson played 18 Playoff Minutes in 17 games (1.1 Playoff Minutes Per Game). Hopson was flipped to SAC in 1991 for Bobby Hansen and a 1992 2nd.
Hansen was a bench player, and he chipped in 69 Playoff Minutes in 22 games and retired after the 1992 Finals. He did have a playoff moment that was so epic that it became known as The Bobby Hansen Game. I look at that game in this video.
1992
#27. Byron Houston. At the start of the season, he was traded in a three-team trade to GSW(!). CHI gave up Houston, 1996 2nd, a future 2nd, and got Rodney McCray. McCray was a vet who retired after the season. He played 15.9 MPG in the regular season, and 39 Playoff Minutes in 22 games.
#33. Corey Williams. Played 242 minutes in 1992-93. Played 0 Playoff Minutes. Waived at the start of the next season.
#39. Litterial Green. Traded after two weeks for 1993 #41.
#52. Matt Steigenga. Did not play in the NBA until spot minutes in 1997.
1993
#25. Corie Blount. Played in 1993-94 and 1994-95. Sold to LAL after that season. Played in 1995 in 10 games.
#41. Anthony Reed. Waived before the season.
1994
#21. Dickey Simpkins. He was a bench big, playing around 10 minutes per game. He was actually traded to Dubs after the 1997 Finals for Scott Burrell and then waived, and then ended up back with CHI, just in time for the 1998 Finals. He played 74 Playoff Minutes out of 68 games.
#49. Kris Bruton. Never made the NBA.
1995
#20. Jason Caffey. Across three seasons, Caffey was the most productive Bulls draft pick across the 8 year dynasty, playing 14.5 MPG across 183 games in three seasons. He didn’t play in the 1996 Playoffs, but he did chip in 167 Playoff Minutes in the 1997 Playoffs. He was on the roster for 37 Playoff Games.
He was cruelly traded before the three-peat to GSW for David Vaughn (played 6 minutes for CHI), 1998 2nd, and 2000 2nd. Which is not a bad haul for a salary dump, but in no way helped extend the dynasty. To be fair, Krause was already committed to breaking up the Dynasty by the 1997 season.#31. Dragan Tarlać. A draft-and-stash that didn’t make the NBA until 2000-01, playing about half a season for the wasteland Bulls.
1996
#29. Travis Knight. He actually carved out a 7 year NBA career… but not for CHI. CHI drafted him and then bizarrely cut him within a month instead of offering him a rookie deal. That’s a catastrophe of draft scouting.
#58. Traded to DAL in the Byron Houston trade (see 1992 #27).
1997
#28. Keith Booth. Played 17 minutes for the 1997-98 Bulls. 0 Playoff Minutes.
#57. Roberto Dueñas. A draft-and-stash that never made the NBA.
Evaluating the Drafts
In the master series post, I considered a range of options for comparing how well Dynasty teams drafted, and came up with a simple measure: simply count up the total number of minutes the draftees played in playoff games.
Is this a perfect measure? Of course not. But it captures directly how much the team trusted them to play in the only setting that counts for a Dynasty, and how much they were available. Doesn’t this advantage teams whose Dynasty lasted longer? YES. That’s not a bug, it’s a feature. If your draft is part of a process that leads to a longer Dynasty, that is better drafting.
The Verdict
I feel dirty after analyzing that Bulls draft. If any contender ever feels bad about their drafts, they should come look at this stretch. The Bulls drafted or traded draft picks for 17 players who totaled 387 Playoff Minutes.
Kevon Looney himself totaled 819 Playoff Minutes in the 2015-2019 Five Finals run and out-contributed the entire 17-player eight-year draft. Jordan Poole’s 606 Playoff Minutes dwarfed the entire Bulls Dynasty draft. Jordan Bell (279) and Patrick McCaw (197) both played more playoff minutes than Jason Caffey (167) who is by far the biggest playoff contributor of the Bulls Dynasty Draft. Damian Jones (40) played more minutes than all but three of the 17 Bulls draftees.
So the question isn’t whether the GSW draft is better, because it obviously is.
It’s not even whether the Bulls had the worst Dynasty draft of all time, because they are in last by a LONG shot.
The question is whether this is the worst eight-year stretch of drafting in NBA history. The answer is probably no, and an excursion through the Warriors draft history will make grown men weep, but this Bulls draft has got to be in the running. The only excuse is that it is hard to pick so late in the draft year after year.
Verdict: MY EYES, THE GOGGLES, THEY DO NOTHING
How well did the Dynasty Pistons draft?
This is our shortest dynasty, but they technically count according to my definition (three Finals, the majority of a stretch). They made the Finals in 1988, 1989 and 1990.
1988
#30. Fennis Dembo. Played 74 minutes in the 1988-89 season and 4 Playoff Minutes in 17 games. He was released after one season.
#48. Micheal Williams. He played 7.3 MPG in the regular season, and 6 Playoff Minutes in 17 games. He was traded after one season (see 1989 #27 for details).
#72. Lee Johnson. He did not make the NBA.
1989
#27. Kenny Battle. The Pistons traded the rights to Kenny Battle and Micheal Williams to the Suns for rights to Anthony Cook on the draft day. Anthony Cook rejected the DET contract and went to Greece. Anthony Cook was traded Sep 1990 to DEN for a 1992 protected 2nd that was never exercised, and he ended up with a multi-year NBA career.
The Verdict
These two drafts netted a total of 10 Playoff Minutes. Let’s not even mention Kevon Looney, Jordan Poole, Jordan Bell, Pat McCaw, or even Damian Jones. My friends, JACOB EVANS had more playoff minutes (18 PM) than all the Pistons Dynasty draftees combined. He also had more regular season minutes.
Verdict: The GSW Dynasty drafts were clearly better, as DET got literally almost nothing out of their draft. I still consider the Michael Jordan Chicago Bulls Dynasty draft to be worse, due to the sheer number of draft picks over eight years that didn’t pan out.
How well did the Dynasty Sixers draft?
Larry Bird is famous for his rivalry with Magic Johnson, but in the first half of the 1980s, Julius Erving was considered Bird’s true rival. They were constantly having to war in the playoffs, and they actually guarded each other. The first computer basketball games were made about their rivalry, not Bird and Magic (that came later).
The Philadelphia 76ers went to the 1980 Finals, beating Larry Bird’s Celtics in the ECF and losing in 6 games to the Magic Johnson Lakers, lost the 1981 ECF to the vengeful Celtics, beat the Celtics AGAIN in 1982 ECF only to lose AGAIN to the Lakers in 6.
Moses Malone was actually an MVP when PHI traded for him in Sept 1982 and that put them over the hump. People didn’t know at the time to whine and moan about MVPs joining up, you see. Naive commentators didn’t whinge that things didn’t count and try to take their ball and leave. And so PHI finally broke through in 1983, sweeping the Lakers in the Finals in what Moses Malone predicted would be a “Fo Fo Fo” playoffs run (they actually did lose one game in the run, but close enough).
Let’s see how this dynasty drafted.
1980
#8. Andrew Toney. He was a legendary scorer, a beautiful player, and a two-time All-Star whose career was cut short by foot injuries. His microwave scoring off the bench was an important part of the 76ers success. He totaled 1420 Playoff Minutes, averaging over 28 Playoff Minutes Per Game.
#21. Monti Davis. Played 10 total minutes for PHI.
#44. Clyde Austin. Didn’t make the NBA.
Numerous other later picks… the draft was long back then. We won’t punish picks after #60. None of the later picks made the NBA.
1981
#22. Franklin Edwards. A decent backup point guard averaging 12.1 MPG for PHI in the regular season across three seasons. Played 133 Playoff Minutes in 34 games (3.9 PMPG).
#46. Vernon Smith. Didn’t make the NBA.
Many other picks.
1982
#22. Mark McNamara. Played 182 regular season minutes, and 2 Playoff Minutes in 13 games.
#36. J. J. Anderson. Played 48 regular season minutes for PHI and was waived midseason.
#45. Russ Schoene. He beat the odds and played 15.3 MPG in the 1982-83 regular season, but was traded mid-season to IND for center Clemon Johnson.
Clemon Johnson actually played a lot for PHI, chipping in 202 Playoff Minutes in 13 games as a backup center.Many other picks.
Evaluating the Drafts
In the master series post, I considered a range of options for comparing how well Dynasty teams drafted, and came up with a simple measure: simply count up the total number of minutes the draftees played in playoff games.
Is this a perfect measure? Of course not. But it captures directly how much the team trusted them to play in the only setting that counts for a Dynasty, and how much they were available. Doesn’t this advantage teams whose Dynasty lasted longer? YES. That’s not a bug, it’s a feature. If your draft is part of a process that leads to a longer Dynasty, that is better drafting.
Warriors Summary
The Warriors got players totaling 2650 Playoff Minutes, and made the sign-and-trade for Andre Iguodala (2912 Playoff Minutes) possible. Here is everything summarized in one chart:
The Verdict
Let’s compare this draft to the GSW Dynasty.
PHI got Andrew Toney and nobody else of note. We’ve been using Playoff Minutes as a standard, and by the standard, Kevon Looney himself almost matches Toney’s 1420 minutes. So to be consistent, I would have to say, GSW crushed PHI.
And yet… it’s Andrew Toney. You may not remember him today, but he was a Hall of Fame caliber legend, derailed by his injuries. He contributed 1420 Playoff Minutes, averaging over 28 Playoff Minutes Per Game.
This was a home run pick that was essential to the PHI run. So that alone crushes the Warriors Dynasty draft (and every other Dynasty draft so far).
Here’s the subtlety. How the heck did the 76ers get a #8 draft pick?! They got it in trade from IND in 1976 for Mel Bennett, who was a rookie who scored 12.1 PPG in 29.2 MPG in the ABA. Not a star, a decent role player who ended up playing a total of 129 NBA games. Basically, they ripped off IND, because back in those days, teams didn’t value the picks much. In fact, teams didn’t know whether the league was going to survive from year to year (the NBA had just merged with the ABA to avoid bankruptcy) and draft picks were thrown around like Jack In The Box coupons. It was a different time.
No dynasty since the 1980s has been able to draft better than #20. The Dynasty Warriors never drafted better than #28 until after the Five Finals run. Ignoring the Toney pick, PHI got almost nothing out of their drafts.
Verdict: How do you evaluate this? It’s Andrew Toney versus the Warriors getting two key role players and four bench guys who did play. If you ignore the #8 pick, then the Warriors crushed the Sixers. The 1980s were a different time.
How well did the Larry Bird Celtics draft?
In 1984, the Larry Bird - Kevin McHale - Robert Parish Boston Celtics powers their way to a sweet revenge win in the Finals vs their arch-rivals, the Magic Johnson Lakers. In 1985 they made it back to the Finals, only to fall to the vengeful Lakers. In 1986, they added Bill Walton (gasp another MVP pearl clutch how can two MVPs join forces cancel the league etc etc) and cruised to another trophy, when the LAL got upset by HOU. In 1987, they survived two 7 games series to get to their fourth straight Finals, only to lose again to LAL.
How did their drafting support their dynasty?
1984
#24. Michael Young. Waived before the season began.
#47. Ronnie Williams. Never made the NBA.
#70. Rick Carlisle. Before becoming a mastermind coach, he was a bench player for BOS, averaging 7.9 MPG across 3 seasons. He only played in the playoffs in 1986, tallying 54 Playoff Minutes in 18 games (3.0 Playoff MPG).
Many other draft picks.
1985
#20. Sam Vincent. Played 7.8 MPG across 2 seasons. This translated into 182 Playoff Minutes in 41 games (4.4 PMPG).
#24. Traded with 1988 2nd for #20 to POR. In the final analysis, not a great deal, as POR took Terry Porter with the pick.
#47. Sent to NYK with 1986 2nd as compensation for BOS signing Ray Williams. Ray played 23 games for BOS, and chipped in 278 Playoff Minutes across 21 games, a very respectable 13.2 Playoff MPG.
Many other draft picks.
1986
#2. Len Bias. Len Bias was a really promising player, but two days after the draft, Bias tragically died of a cocaine overdose. We’ll never really know what would have happened with Bias’s career. In the heartless eyes of our analysis, Bias contributed 0 Playoff Minutes.
You may well wonder how the heck a dynasty team got a freaking #2 pick. In contrast to many other trades of this era, this wasn’t a complete ripoff of an incompetent team. In 1984, BOS traded Gerald Henderson, who was a starter but holding out for a better contract, to SEA for this pick. SEA happened to “win” the lottery to upgrade their #5 pick to #2. BOS got lucky… and then extremely unlucky.
#24. Traded in 1985 with Cedric Maxwell to LAC for Bill Walton. Younger people probably only know him as the spacy Deadhead announcer father of Luke Walton, but in his prime, Bill Walton was one of the best centers in history. Unfortunately, his feet kept him off the court. But in 1986, he became a super-sub for BOS and even contributed 291 Playoff Minutes (and then 101 the next year as his body broke down), for a total of 393 Playoff Minutes in 41 games, a rate of 9.6 Playoff MPG.
Incidentally POR used this traded pick to draft the legendary Arvydas Sabonis, who was in the Soviet Union and thus had about as much chance of playing in the NBA as Vladimir Putin today, but hey, shooters gotta shoot.
#47. Traded to NYK, see 1985 #47.
The Verdict
This analysis is a cold-hearted one. We’re not judging the competence, strategies, or luck of the drafts. So yes, BOS really had some bad luck with Bias’s death. But in the end, we count up how much the draft picks contribute to the team’s dynastic run, and it’s part of the story that Bias’s death left BOS with nothing, which made their grim other drafting hurt even worse.
BOS across four drafts got five players who contributed 236 Playoff Minutes. (Actually it was a lot more players, but I won’t ding teams for drafting into the third round, which doesn’t exist now.) In comparison, Jordan Bell played more minutes himself. Then throw in Kevon Looney (and Pat McCaw and Damian Jones) and the Warriors definitely got more out of the draft.
BOS did use picks to help trade for Bill Walton (393 PM) and Ray Williams (278 PM). That’s collectively less than Kevon Looney, and a lot less than Andre Iguodala’s 2851 PM.
Verdict: BOS, through some bad luck, drafted much worse than the Warriors Dynasty.
The Extended Dynasty: Drafting the Big Three
Technically, by my rules I could have included the 1980 Finals along with the 1984-1987 run, as that just squeaks over the “majority of Finals” rule. But this didn't feel right. We’d have a “Dynasty” that began by winning a trophy, then losing in the ECF, then losing in the second round. That’s a dynasty?? That just feels wrong.
If we had included the 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983 drafts, there was some supremely excellent drafting. BOS robbed GSW blind in 1980, trading #1 and #13 for #3 and Robert Parish. #3 became Kevin McHale. Bam, the foundation of a dynasty. They also nabbed Greg Kite (377 Playoff Minutes) and at #31, a huge steal of Danny Ainge (2354 Dynasty Playoff Minutes).
(GSW got Joe Barry Carroll and Rickey Brown, who had decent NBA careers, but who were letdowns. JBC was cruelly nicknamed Joe Barely Cares. This is well documented elsewhere.)
But to me, that is drafting the foundation of a new dynasty while you are so-so, not extending your dynasty by drafting well.
Also, the question is how the hell BOS got the #1 pick anyway which allowed them to fleece GSW. The answer is basically tanking. BOS was dreadful in 1977-78. They then drafted Larry Bird at #6 (a whole year before he planned to play pro). Then of course, they were terrible in 1978-79. Then they arbitraged their 1979 picks and also shuffling Bob McAdoo between teams to get the 1980 #1 and #13 picks. DET made the trade due to famous TV personality Dick Vitale, who was briefly coach and would be fired soon after and be forever finished in the NBA, as his DET team cratered to their worst season ever… and handed BOS #1.
So basically, BOS tanked for a couple of years waiting for Larry Bird to come save them and made an incredible series of trades to fleece DET and GSW to get them solid draft picks timed with Larry Bird’s era.
Extended Dynasty Verdict: BOS drafted legendarily better than GSW, but by ripping off teams for top draft picks. The 1980s were a different time.
How well did the Magic Johnson Lakers draft?
The Lakers dominated the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1991, they made the Finals an impressive 9 times out of 12. In 1980, the rookie Magic Johnson revitalized the team and they made a surprising run all the way to the Finals and beat Julius Erving’s 76ers. In 1981, LAL had its only really bad playoff, getting stunned in the first round 1-2 by the Houston Rockets. Yes, in those days the first round was Best of 3. Silly idea. This thwarted the widely expected LAL-BOS Finals.
In 1982, Magic Johnson helped stage a coup against Coach Westhead, and the new coach Pat Riley guided LAL to another ring (over poor PHI again). In 1983, PHI finally got their revenge by sweeping LAL in the Finals. The next two years, LAL famously lost to BOS in 7, then beat them in the rematch in 6. In 1986, HOU upset LAL again in the WCF, keeping the no-repeat champs streak alive. 1987 was the Bird-Magic tie-breaker and LAL beat BOS in 6 in the Finals. 1988, LAL beat the Bad Boy Pistons to become the first repeat NBA champion since 1969. Pat Riley trademarked Threepeat, and then LAL got swept by DET the following year in the Finals. 1991 was the last gasp of Finals glory where they went up 1-0 over Michael Jordan’s Bulls, but then got swept the rest of the way.
1980
#22. Traded with Don Ford to CLE for Butch Lee and a 1982 1st. Lee played 6 Playoff Minutes for LAL in 16 games, but that 1982 pick would turn out to be massive [foreshadowing]. Don Ford was a role player playing 19.5 MPG and definitely not worth a 1st round pick from a terrible team.
#26. Traded with 1981 #28 and Oliver Mack, for Mark Landsberger. This big played four seasons as a role player, racking up 428 Playoff Minutes in 48 games.
#31. Wayne Robinson. Traded before the season to DET for 1981 2nd.
#37. Butch Carter. Played 54 games, but 0 Playoff Minutes. Traded in 1981 to IND for 1982 3rd.
#45. Sent to DET as compensation for LAL signing Jim Price. He never played in the dynasty.
1981
#19. Mike McGee. This steady role player wing averaged 15 MPG across 5 seasons for LAL. He played 693 Playoff Minutes in 83 games.
#28. Traded, see 1980 #26.
#39. Harvey Knuckles. Never made the NBA.
#42. Elvis Rolle. Never made the NBA.
#88. Kevin McKenna. Played 36 games for LAL before being waived.
1982
#1. James Worthy. Wait, what? How does a dynasty actually land a #1 pick? I told you above at 1980 #22, but maybe it didn’t sink in. That trade regularly makes the Top 10 Worst NBA Trades list, and the CLE owner Ted Stepien was so clueless and horrible that the NBA created a rule named after him to stop future owners from being as stupid and self-destructive (yes, the Stepien Rule).
James Worthy, Hall of Famer. 50th Anniversary All-time Team. 7-time All-Star. 5149 Playoff Minutes in 139 games.
#21. Traded in 1980 to NYN for Eddie Jordan. This backup point guard played spot minutes in the regular season and chipped in a total of 10 Playoff Minutes in 17 games.
#44. In 1982, sent to Washington Bullets with Jim Chones, Brad Holland and 1983 1st as compensation for LAL signing Mitch Kupchak. Yes, before he was a GM for the Lakers, he was a hard-nosed power forward. In 1982, he was the starter, but injured his knee and was never the same. He stuck with LAL through 1986, but only played 322 Playoff Minutes in 83 games (3.9 Playoff MPG).
1983
#22. Traded to WSB, see 1982 #44.
#46. Traded in 1981 to NJN for Bob McAdoo. WTF?? How, how does LAL manage to trade a late 2nd round pick for a 29 year old future Hall of Famer, and recent MVP and All-Star? He had some injuries, but more importantly, he held out against NJN trying to force them to meet his salary demands. So NJN panicked and dumped him for a 2nd rounder. Ay caramba, truly the 1980s were Amateur Hour in the NBA, except amateur hour lasted a whole decade.
McAdoo became a super Sixth Man for four seasons and a key contributor to the Lakers dynasty, racking up 1399 Playoff Minutes in 69 games, a very respectable 20.3 Playoff MPG.
1984
#23. Earl Jones. Played two games for LAL and then dumped to SAS for cash.
#46. In 1980, traded to POR for Jim Brewer. Brewer was a bench power forward, who played 13.9 MPG for two seasons for LAL. He played 64 Playoff Minutes in 17 games.
For the 1984-85 season, the NBA re-established a league-wide salary cap.
1985
#23. A.C. Green. Folks, here we have it. The first game-changing late draft pick in the entire dynasty article series. This was an honest find in the late draft, not some rip off trade of a doddering fool owner. Green was famously durable and was the starting PF by his second year. He played 2491 Playoff Minutes in 99 games during the Dynasty for a very respectable 25.2 Playoff MPG.
#46. Traded in 1983 to CHI for Dwight Jones. Jones played out the season with LAL and retired after. He chipped in 59 Playoff Minutes in 15 games.
#69. Compensation to CHI for LAL signing Larry Spriggs. This bench wing ended up playing 288 Playoff Minutes in 54 games.
1986
#23. Ken Barlow. Didn’t make the NBA.
#46. In 1983, traded with Eddie Jordan, Norm Nixon and 1987 2nd to SDC for Swen Nater and Byron Scott. Swen Nater was a Center who played 146 Playoff Minutes in 21 games in 1984, before retiring. Norm Nixon was an All-Star point guard whose game clashed with Magic Johnson, and so he had to go.
Byron Scott was a rookie who soon became the LAL starting SG for the next decade. In the dynasty years he played 4369 Playoff Minutes in 139 games.
This draft pick probably didn’t make a difference in this trade happening, but we list this here for completeness.
1987
#23. Traded to SAS in 1987 with 1990 2nd, Frank Brickowski, Pétur Guðmundsson, for Mychal Thompson. This trade locked down the backup center position for the rest of the decade. He racked up 1660 Playoff Minutes in 85 games. And a sweet shooting son.
#46. Traded to SDC. See 1986 #46.
1988
#25. David Rivers. This small speedbug parleyed a good performance at Notre Dame into a first round selection, despite his 6’ 0” size. Played 33 Playoff Minutes in 15 games, and was taken away in the expansion draft. Played 114 total NBA games.
#50. Traded in 1985 to PHX with a 1989 2nd for Maurice Lucas. Lucas played out the 1985-86 season and was waived after the season. Played 319 Playoff Minutes in 14 games. (By the way, PHX drafted Steve Kerr with this pick!)
1989
#26. Vlade Divac. And here we have our second awesome find in the late first round. Divac would be the starting center until 1996 when he was traded for… Kobe Bryant. For the purposes of this study, we only count his dynasty playoff time, which is 784 Playoff Minutes in 28 games, a healthy sixth-man rate of 28 Playoff MPG.
#52. Traded to PHX, see 1988 #50.
1990
#27. Elden Campbell. This skilled big carved out a long NBA career, so this was another great find late in the draft. However, he only played 138 Playoff Minutes for the dynasty in 19 games.
#51. Tony Smith. A backup guard for four seasons with LAL. He contributed 40 Playoff Minutes in 19 games.
#54. Traded. See 1987 #23.
Evaluating the Drafts
In the master series post, I considered a range of options for comparing how well Dynasty teams drafted, and came up with a simple measure: simply count up the total number of minutes the draftees played in playoff games.
Is this a perfect measure? Of course not. But it captures directly how much the team trusted them to play in the only setting that counts for a Dynasty, and how much they were available. Doesn’t this advantage teams whose Dynasty lasted longer? YES. That’s not a bug, it’s a feature. If your draft is part of a process that leads to a longer Dynasty, that is better drafting.
Warriors Summary
The Warriors got players totaling 2650 Playoff Minutes, and made the sign-and-trade for Andre Iguodala (2912 Playoff Minutes) possible. Here is everything summarized in one chart:
The Verdict
This was truly tremendous drafting and prospect development by the Lakers. Let’s put aside the all-time great dynasty draft pick of James Worthy, because he was a #1 pick, and the result of a swindle. LAL still found A.C. Green at #23, Vlade Divac at #26 and Elden Campbell at #27. Green alone (2491 Playoff Minutes) almost exceeds the combined Playoff Minutes of GSW’s picks (2912 PM).
What about GSW using picks to trade for Andre Iguodala? The Lakers used picks to trade for / sign as free agents: Bob McAdoo, Byron Scott, Mychael Thompson, plus a scattering of other bench players. Three huge contributors to the playoff pushes.
One moderating factor for GSW is that the LAL dynasty lasted through 11 drafts and GSW had 7 drafts. LAL had quite a few dud draft picks and trade targets, so it’s not like they were laser-guided accurate. Their average draft pick effectiveness was so-so. However, for a dynasty, the only important measure are the hits.
Another generally moderating factor is that in the 1980s, pro basketball was a much more amateur business. You can tell that generally speaking draft picks were not valued as highly in a time when the NBA was in shaky financial times, and so it’s naturally to assume draft selection also was not valued. Basically, LAL crushed worse competition.
So this is closer than it seems... but it’s still not close. LAL wins on peak draft picks and on overall return (9328 Playoff Minutes drafted vs GSW’s 2912 PM, 9070 PM traded for vs GSW’s 2912 PM) and on quality of late picks. So pretty much in every dimension.
Verdict: Whether or not you include the rip-off high draft picks, the rip-off trades, or include traded players, LAL had the greatest Dynasty drafts. Which is probably why they had the longest Dynasty!
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The difference between Kerr and Shanahan was made very clear today. Kerr recognizes his strengths and weaknesses or at least does not deny them when they become apparent and works on changing them. First year coach with a win now roster? Fuck it, go get me Alvin Gentry. I've spent my whole coaching career with a championship favorite and now I'm being tasked on developing high lottery picks and my first stab at doing that sucked? Fuck it, go get me Atkinson, Milojevic, and Mahlelala.
Shanahan either does not recognize his weaknesses (which certainly includes young QB development) or does not care to improve on them. People throw out the word "stubborn" for Kerr a lot which is laughable to me, but if you gave that label to Shanahan I would not object.
Congrats to Bo Cruz! I still wish we’d take a flyer on him. Maybe if Andre retires…