Chris Paul's got "55" on it: How the double drag concept can maximize his time with the Warriors

Constructing a ball-screen scheme around the "Point God" may be the most prudent approach.

During the third quarter of a ho-hum regular season game in Oklahoma City against the Thunder — deep within the doldrums of a 2022-23 slate filled with championship hangovers, a closed-fist morale dampener, and a head-scratching penchant for mediocre play away from the confines of Chase Center — Stephen Curry received an inbound pass and was clearly seen holding both his hands up just before crossing the half-court line.

Of course, without context, this could mean several things. It could be a plea toward Curry’s teammates to slow things down, to stay calm, and to keep their composure. It could very well be a reassuring gesture, as if to say, “I’ve got this guys, don’t worry.”

(Spoiler alert: Curry did get it. But more on that later.)

In truth, Curry is performing his duties as the Warriors’ playmaker and on-floor play caller. Steve Kerr is the main decision maker when it comes to which half-court sets the team runs, but the trust he has in Curry — cultivated throughout the years they’ve spent together as head coach and point guard — allows him to defer play-calling duties to his superstar.

So, what does the gesture above really mean? It’s Curry calling out a staple Warriors half-court set called “55” — hence the two open-palm signal he raises to symbolize two fives. Each team has their own terminology for actions that are ubiquitous throughout the league; “55” happens to be what the Warriors call their version of double ball screens (or double drag screens if the two screeners involved come from a position of trailing behind).

“55” (double ball/double drag screens)

Double ball screens are in most NBA teams’ playbooks — even the Warriors, who have been notorious for shying away from heavy ball-screen-based offensive schemes in favor of 5-out motion concepts, playmaking at the elbows and low post, and “0.5” basketball. Last season alone, the Warriors were tied with the Sacramento Kings in pick-and-roll possessions per game during the regular season — including those that ended with a shot attempt, free throw, or turnover by someone other than the ball handler and screener — at 27.6, per Synergy. That number placed both of them dead last in the league.

Whenever the Warriors did decide to run the pick-and-roll, they were highly efficient (1.042 PPP) because they had one of the most effective pick-and-roll ball handlers in the league in Curry (1.175 PPP, best among 58 players with a minimum 500 pick-and-roll possessions last season). But a Curry pick-and-roll possession is more the exception than the norm — saved for the most high-stakes moments such as end-of-game situations in the regular season and during the playoffs.

Whether it’s on “Angle” pick-and-roll possessions (a ball screen set near the slot or wing area with three offensive players spaced out on the corners and opposite slot/wing) or “55,” Curry’s intelligence and craft as a pick-and-roll ball handler is often underappreciated because the volume is relatively low. But I’d offer that Curry is one of the smartest players in the league in terms of how to attack defenses around a ball screen — and not just because of his otherworldly pull-up shooting.

Let’s go back to the picture above of Curry calling out “55.” Look at how he attacks the Thunder with planning and knowledge of opposing personnel:

From a results standpoint, the set was an astounding success. But what was the process that led to it?

Let’s recap:

1. Curry — knowing that the Thunder’s ball-screen coverage is to switch 1-4 and drop their 5 — directs Jonathan Kuminga, who’s being guarded by Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, to be the first screener in “55.” That triggers the switch by Gilgeous-Alexander onto Curry (helped by Kuminga immediately diving after the screen, leaving Curry’s man no choice but to switch), who then dribbles his way toward Kevon Looney.

2. Having Gilgeous-Alexander defend the second ball screen picks at his questionable screen navigation chops, all while taking advantage of the fact that Mike Muscala is in drop coverage. Curry’s calculations prove to be correct — Gilgeous-Alexander ducks under the Looney screen, a death sentence against Curry.

3. Also take note that Klay Thompson and Donte DiVincenzo — two capable spot-up shooters — occupy the corners. This nails their defenders to them and lowers the chances of them helping off.

Double ball screens are more than just deciding to have two screeners set staggered screens for the ball handler and letting things happen. It picks at a specific defensive pressure point — whether it’s at the point of attack or off the ball — in order to generate good offense in the half court.

The benefit of having Curry is that he’s the best of both point guard worlds — or archetypes, to be more specific. He has mastered the modern point-guard profile of scoring in all sorts of ways, both on and off the ball. But if need be, he can moonlight as the classical point guard: possess the ball the most, hold onto it the longest, siphon all of the offensive energy onto himself, and redirect it as he pleases.

That description fits Curry when it needs to fit him and the team’s needs. But the acquisition of Chris Paul — arguably the last of a dying breed of “pure” point guards — makes it so that running a ball-screen-heavy offense won’t just be a product of luxury, but an outright necessity whenever Paul is on the floor.

Paul isn’t Curry off the ball. As a classical point guard, he needs the ball in his hands to be effective. If Curry is reluctant to monopolize the ball and the entire offense — only doing so in times of dire need — Paul’s skill set and demeanor as a competitor demands that he monopolize the ball and the entire offense for the majority of the time.

Kerr’s task, therefore, is to implement two entirely different offensive schemes — both on the opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum — that cater to both Curry and Paul. Fortunately for Kerr, “55” and a couple of other ball-screen-based sets provide him with institutional knowledge and the foundation to construct a half-court offense around Paul.

Running double ball screens is far from a foreign concept for Paul. He ran it heavily with the Phoenix Suns (whose terminology for it was “77”), a team that profiled extensively as a ball-screen-based offense over the last two seasons: second in pick-and-rolls per game in 2021-22, fifth in 2022-23, per Synergy.

As one would expect, Paul’s individual numbers as a pick-and-roll ball handler were nothing to scoff at:

• 2021-22: 1,365 possessions, 1.108 PPP (first out of 55 players with a minimum 500 pick-and-roll possessions)

• 2022-23: 1,134 possessions, 1.066 PPP (13th out of 58 players with a minimum 500 pick-and-roll possessions)

Paul’s mastery of the pick-and-roll is built upon a solid foundation of advanced read-making chops, tempo control, and high-level passing. Akin to a quarterback sifting through his progressions, he reads the defense and makes his decision based on which poison defenders choose to ingest.

Scoring is almost always the last option on his list, but whenever he decides to call his own number, Paul makes sure to get to his sweet spot using patience, guile, and an unmatched ability to snake his way toward his comfort zone:

More often than not, however, defenses will choose to shrink the floor to prevent such an outcome — or prevent one of Paul’s screening partners in the double ball screen setup from diving with an open lane to the rim. Having the “low” man — the defender guarding the weak-side corner — come over to “tag” the roll man is one method of prevention.

Like most choices defenders make, there’s risk involved. Tagging the roll means a momentary window is opened toward the weak-side corner. Leaving that window open for even a split-second gives Paul all the time he needs to laser a pass toward the corner:

It’s unthinkable to leave someone like Devin Booker — among Earth’s elite shooters — wide open as a result of packing the paint against a Deandre Ayton roll. But in a double ball screen setup with Paul pulling the strings, that’s exactly what happens below:

The Suns also liked to shift chess pieces around the double ball screen board. Booker was occasionally the weak-side corner spacer left open by the defense; other times, it was Kevin Durant — not only one of today’s best shooters but one of the greatest shooters of all time — who defenses opted to leave open to pack the paint against Paul and Ayton:

The next time over, the Suns run double ball screens again. This time, the low man attempts to tag but hesitates upon realizing that Durant will be left open again. This brief moment of indecision allows Ayton to roll to the rim unimpeded, resulting in a desperation foul by the low man that sends Ayton to the line:

Paul himself has shown a recent willingness to be the weak-side corner spacer punishing tags in the double ball screen alignment, with Booker as the ball handler and Durant and Ayton as the screeners. An aggressive coverage against Booker puts the defense in rotation, forced in huge part by Paul opting to “shake” or lift from the corner to the wing:

The Warriors can throw out something similar with Curry as the ball handler and Paul as the corner man in “55” with multiple combinations of ancillary players on the floor — whether it’s Thompson, Andrew Wiggins, or Moses Moody as the spacers and Looney, Draymond Green, or Dario Šarić as the screeners.

(Šarić, in particular, has experience working with Paul in the pick-and-roll and provides a pop-out option the Warriors have never had before in a 6-foot-10-inch player profile.)

None of the aforementioned three big men are particularly athletic leapers, which limits Paul’s ability to place the ball above the rim due to their limited — near non-existent, even — catch radius. This is where having the likes of Kuminga and Trayce Jackson-Davis could be a blessing for the Warriors’ second unit.

Paul developing pick-and-roll synergy with Kuminga and Jackson-Davis provides a two-fold benefit. It unlocks their above-the-rim capabilities and maximizes their vertical athleticism, with help from a point guard that has a history of transforming divers and leapers into impactful contributors. It also is an avenue for efficient offense with Curry on the bench; roll gravity from Kuminga and Jackson-Davis opens up additional targets for Paul to hit should defenders take the bait.

If Kuminga and Jackson-Davis are unleashed in double ball screen setups with Paul as the ball handler, finishes like the one below will become a more common sight next season:

Concerns about health, availability, and defense aside (as well as the question that has burned the fiercest ever since the trade was made official: Will Paul start?), having Paul as a relief option in non-Curry minutes — and occasionally pairing him up with Curry on the floor — will give Kerr more flexibility despite the notion of “limiting” his free-flowing philosophy to something more deliberate and antithetical to his preference.

Hanging your hat upon the lowest-hanging fruit that Paul can dangle in front of defenses — a ball-screen-heavy half-court offense with the double ball screen concept as its driving force — may be the key to maximizing the 38-year-old so-called “Point God.”